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Abstract 
In order to reap all benefits from telecommunications, competing firms 
typically have to cooperate in order to exploit economies of scale and scope. 
Thus, firms being active in the same market are supposed to compete in 
some dimensions and cooperate in other dimensions. There is potentially a 
trade-off between cooperation and competition. In this dissertation four 
cases of interplay between competition and cooperation are investigated and 
we find that in some cases there is indeed a trade-off. In some cases (but not 
all cases) firms can arrange their cooperation such that they are able to soften 
competition and increase prices. Whether such effects are present or not 
depends on technology and market characteristics. It is accordingly 
necessary to carry out case by case analysis in order to assess the interplay 
between cooperation and competition. A common feature of the four papers 
in the dissertation is that they take as a starting point a concrete and policy 
relevant issue where telecommunications firms have to cooperate. Game 
theoretic models are adapted to each case and particular care is taken in 
capturing relevant market and technology features. 
 
 iv
 v
Acknowledgements 
A number of people have contributed to this dissertation at various stages in 
the process. I would, in particular, like to express my gratitude to my 
supervisor, Professor Christian Riis. He has given very helpful comments 
and suggestions to the work in the dissertation.  
My former colleague at Telenor R&D, Øystein Foros is co author in two of 
the papers in the dissertation. To work with Øystein has been inspiring and 
I’m still working on following his example in effectively finalising papers 
and submitting them for publication. I have also appreciated the cooperation 
with Jan Yngve Sand in co-authoring a paper.  
In my research I have benefited from the technical insight and understanding 
of telecommunications provided by colleagues at Telenor R&D, in particular 
Vegard Masdal. Furthermore, my research has benefited from discussions 
with Robert Pettersen at NPT on telecommunications regulation.  
I would like to thank Telenor, and in particular the R&D department, for 
financing this dissertation. I am grateful to Professor Øystein Fjeldstad and 
the Centre for Management of Telecom and Network Industry at the 
Norwegian School of Management for offering me an opportunity to finalise 
my work on a PhD that started out at the University of Oslo and continued at 
Telenor R&D.  
Finally, I would like to thank my family – my incredibly patient wife Kjersti 
as well as my three beautiful girls Mari, Johanne and Kathrine, always 
willing to put my work in the right perspective. 
 
 
 
Oslo, 29 May 2006 
Bjørn Hansen 
 vi
Contents 
Section 1: Introduction 
 1. Introduction       1 
 2. A brief introduction to the literature    3 
 3. Market experience      4 
 4. Modelling issues      13 
 5. Summary of the dissertation     22 
 6. Concluding remarks      27 
 7. Literature       28 
Section 2: Termination rates and fixed mobile substitution 
Section 3: Network Competition when Costs are 
Heterogeneous 
Section 4: Competition and compatibility among Internet 
Service providers 
Section 5: Demand-side Spillovers and Semi-collusion in the 
Mobile Communications Market Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Facility based competition in telecommunications  
 – Three essays on two-way access and one essay on three-
way access∗ 
1. Introduction 
Deregulation and fast technological change have resulted in a rapid 
transformation of the telecommunications industry. The initial steps of the 
deregulatory process were, in most countries, designed so that newcomers 
invested in some parts of the production chain and then relied on access to 
other parts of the production chain from a regulated incumbent. The terms 
and conditions for such access have typically been regulated. The rationale 
for regulating access is that the regulated segments are considered as 
bottlenecks, i.e. it is prohibitively costly to duplicate already installed 
capacity. The local loop in the fixed network is a classical example. The 
copper cable connecting residential customers to the network will typically 
have sufficient capacity to carry all telephony and Internet related traffic. 
Thus it will be socially wasteful if newcomers had to install new cables to 
reach the household. This kind of access problems is one-way in the sense 
that newcomers need access but incumbents do not.  
One-way access problems have been discussed in the literature, at least since 
the US Supreme Court’s 1912 Terminal Railroad decision (considered as the 
origination of the essential facilities doctrine). Introductions and overviews 
of this literature and its applications to telecommunications can e.g. be found 
in Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Armstrong (2002). The current thesis is not 
focusing on this kind of access problems. 
Telecommunications is characterised by economies of scale on both the 
supply and the demand side. On the supply side technologies like 3rd 
generation mobile systems (3G) and fibre optics are characterised by 
considerable economies of scale. There are accordingly potential gains from 
making networks cooperate on the supply side. On the demand side the 
economies of scale are due to network effects. Willingness to pay for 
network membership typically increases with the number of communication 
partners. Thus there are potential social gains from making sure that 
networks interconnect in order to facilitate communication across networks. 
                                                     
∗ I thank Christian Riis, Øystein Foros and Robert Pettersen for valuable comments 
to earlier drafts of the introductory chapter. 
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These access problems are two-way in the sense that each network controls 
an asset, customers and/or capacity, which is valuable to the other party.  
Since there are gains from cooperation, one should expect that networks, 
being free to negotiate contracts, would be able to design efficient contracts. 
However, networks are at the same time supposed to compete for the same 
customers. Thus there is a danger that networks design their access 
agreements in a way that softens competition. Furthermore, due to the 
network effects, if networks do not interconnect, one may experience 
“network tipping”, i.e. that all consumers join one of the two networks. Then 
a network will succeed in gaining a monopoly position. Thus a firm may 
deny two-way access in an attempt to foreclose the market. At the outset we 
can accordingly expect that under facilities based competition, unregulated 
two-way access will in some cases yield efficient outcomes, in other cases 
there is too much access, and in yet other cases too little. It is accordingly 
not evident that regulatory intervention is required, and furthermore, if such 
intervention is required, it is likely that the regulatory design should depend 
upon characteristics of the market under consideration.  
In this thesis we consider four different two-way access situations and we 
demonstrate that the need for regulatory intervention indeed depends upon 
technology and market characteristics. The four access problems considered 
in the thesis are as follows: 1) Telephony interconnection between a 
competitive mobile sector and a regulated fixed monopoly. 2) Telephony 
interconnection between competing networks when production costs on the 
two networks differ. 3) Interconnection between competing Internet service 
providers, and finally 4) Mutual access to capacity in third generation mobile 
networks.  
The four papers in the thesis confirm that the incentive to provide access, as 
well as the need for regulatory intervention, indeed depends upon factors 
like cost asymmetries, technological characteristics and the types of 
contracts being signed by the players. A prerequisite for policy relevant 
modelling of network competition is accordingly a fairly detailed knowledge 
of technology and market characteristics. Therefore, in section 3 of this 
introduction, we go into some details in describing technology, as well as 
market outcomes.1 Prior to the descriptive section on market experience, we 
                                                     
1 Focusing on one-way access, Faulhaber (2003) argues, based on US experience, 
that the success or failure of introducing competition by regulatory intervention is 
explained by whether at least one of two conditions are fulfilled. The first condition 
being that the dominating firm is excluded from operating in the segment supposed 
to be competitive and the second being that the interface between the regulated and 
competitive segments is technically simple, easy to monitor and require little 
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provide a brief literature overview in section 2. This serves as a context for 
the subsequent descriptive section. In section 4 we consider some modelling 
issues that are of importance when considering network competition. In 
section 5 we provide an overview of the four essays in the thesis. Finally, in 
section 6 we provide some concluding remarks. 
2. A brief introduction to the literature 
All papers in the thesis contain a section reviewing relevant literature for that 
particular paper. Here we will therefore only provide a brief introduction.  
Symmetric interconnection of competing telecommunications networks was 
analyzed by Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a,b), as well as Armstrong (1998). 
The type of interconnection studied in these papers is illustrated below:  
Network 1
ba
Network 2
Interconnection
dc  
Figure 1, Interconnection 
Without interconnection consumers in network 1, respectively 2, can only 
make calls to other consumers in the same network; on-net calls. Due to 
interconnection consumers in network 1 can call consumers in network 2 and 
vice versa; off-net calls. An off-net call from say consumer a to consumer d 
in the illustration above can be divided into two parts. The first part is 
origination, i.e. to convey the call from the caller, consumer a to the 
interconnection interface. The second part is termination, to carry the call 
from the interconnection interface to the receiver, consumer d.  
In the literature one is typically studying a two stage game where the 
competing firms, at stage 1, determine the price of termination and then the 
two networks compete in attracting consumers in the second stage of the 
                                                                                                                            
information. Thus, fairly detailed technical knowledge is required by regulators 
when designing policy.  
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game. A major insight from the work by Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) 
and Gans and King (2001) is that the incentives with respect to setting the 
price of termination depend upon the contracts in the downstream market. 
When there is uniform pricing in the downstream market, the mobile firms 
can use the termination rate as an instrument to soften competition. By 
raising each other’s marginal cost they reduce the competitive pressure. In 
Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998b) it is demonstrated that this effect changes if 
one considers two-part tariffs in the downstream market. Then the profits of 
the mobile firms are independent of the termination rate. Finally, Gans and 
King (2001) consider network based discrimination, i.e. that the prices for 
on- and off-net traffic are allowed to differ, and they find that a low 
termination rate may be used as an instrument to increase profits.  
The basic models described above have been extended in a number of ways. 
Carter and Wright (2003) analyse interconnection of vertically differentiated 
networks, Dessein (2003) considers consumer heterogeneity and Jeon, 
Laffont and Tirole (2004) analyse the implications of willingness to pay for 
receiving calls. Asymmetric termination rates and entry were analysed by 
Peitz (2005). 
In communication networks the utility of being a member of a particular 
network typically increases with the network size. This is called network 
effects and was first analysed by Rohlfs (1974). Rohlfs focuses on the 
existence of multiple equilibria and the resulting problems of starting up a 
new communications service. The work by Rohlfs does not however take 
into account that there may be competing firms offering the network service. 
This is in contrast to Katz and Shapiro (1985) where the implications of 
network externalities within a competitive environment is analysed. Katz 
and Shapiro pay particular attention to the choice of compatibility. They find 
that a large (dominant) firm will prefer too little compatibility, a small firm 
prefers too much compatibility and the industry would jointly prefer too little 
compatibility.2 The seminal analysis by Katz and Shapiro has been extended 
in a number of ways in the literature. A literature overview can e.g. be found 
in Liebowitz and Margolis (2002). 
3. Market experience 
In this section we will discuss some relevant two-way access problems in 
telecommunications. We will comment on technological characteristics as 
                                                     
2 This last result is in contrast to a result in one of the papers in the present thesis; 
Competition and compatibility among Internet Service Providers. This difference is 
explained by different assumptions regarding downstream competition. 
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well as market outcomes with respect to two-way access. Finally, we will 
also briefly discuss the degree of regulatory intervention behind the 
outcomes.  
The implication of the discussion in the current section is that the tension 
between cooperation and competition is not a transitory phenomenon during 
a deregulatory process. Even under full facility-based competition there is a 
potential gain from interconnecting networks. Thus interconnection is an 
issue for “old” as well as “new” services. 
In the literature on two-way access the focus is typically on shared market 
equilibrium. Parameter-restrictions are imposed in order make sure that this 
outcome is achieved. Given these restrictions firms will typically gain from 
providing access. If, however, the parameter restrictions are violated, or 
some firms expect them to be violated, then the market will tend to tip in one 
or the other direction. Thus there will be competition for the market instead 
of competition in the market. Firms competing for the market will not 
necessarily enter voluntarily into two-way access agreements. Below we will 
argue that market observations indeed lend support to this assertion.  
3.1. Fixed and mobile telephony 
Interfaces for interconnecting traditional fixed telephony as well as mobile 
telephony are well established and all firms providing these services are 
typically directly or indirectly interconnected to all other networks. This 
ubiquitous interconnection is the result of a long historical process. Currently 
it is common to make ubiquitous interconnection a requirement in the license 
for telephone companies.  
There are some examples of non interconnected phone companies from the 
early days of telephony history. In the period 1881 to 1886 there were two 
competing phone companies in the capital of Norway, Kristiania.3 The two 
companies rolled out parallel access networks and they competed head to 
head. It was not possible to make calls from one network to the other. The 
period characterised by access competition ended in 1886 because the local 
authorities forced the two companies to merge by denying the companies 
licenses to install new cables until they merged. According to Rinde, (2005), 
p. 146 it was in particular the merchant community of the city that wanted 
the two firms to merge. The arguments were twofold; they wanted all phones 
to be interconnected and they wanted to avoid duplication of civil works 
from network roll out. Similarly, in the period between the end of the Bell 
                                                     
3 The name of the city was changed to Oslo in 1924. 
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patents in 1893 and the Kingsbury commitment in 1913, a number of phone 
companies independent of the Bell system were denied interconnection 
(Brock, 2002). During this period, phone companies competed head to head 
in the US and network effects were used strategically.  
During this early period there was a notable difference in the speed of 
telephony adoption in areas with local competition as compared to areas 
characterized by local monopolies. As an example, according to Rinde 
(2005), the rate of telephony adoption in Kristiania was twice as high as the 
rate of adoption in Copenhagen, which had a local monopoly.  
At present, the termination rates of incumbent fixed operators are subject to 
regulation in both Europe and the US. These rates are supposed to reflect 
underlying costs. In the US, the Telecommunications act of 96 requires 
reciprocity of termination rates (see e.g. DeGraba 2004). Thus, fixed-line 
newcomers are required to charge the same termination rate as the 
incumbent. This is in contrast to Europe where reciprocity is not embedded 
in the regulatory framework, thus the national regulators have to decide on 
whether termination rates should be reciprocal or not.  
Taking Norway as an example, only the fixed incumbent (Telenor) is subject 
to price regulation. Other fixed operators are free to set the termination rate 
they want.4 As illustrated below, all the other fixed operators have 
termination rates above the level charged by the incumbent:  
                                                     
4 They are mandated to interconnect and they are mandated to have a reference offer 
(see NPT 2005a, pp 70 - 71). 
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Figure 2, Termination rates fixed networks, (NOK/min) Norway, January 2006, 
(2 min call, within local termination area) 
The variation in termination rates is to some degree correlated with market 
shares. The smallest networks have the highest termination charges.5  
Similarly there is considerable variation in termination rates in the 
Norwegian mobile sector as well, where the two large networks; Telenor and 
Netcom are subject to differentiated price regulation on mobile termination. 
                                                     
5 There are however some exceptions to this pattern, in particular Ventelo, which is 
the third largest network with a 5% market share. 
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Figure 3, Termination rates mobile networks, (NOK/min) Norway, January 
2006, (2 min call) 
Teletopia and Nordisk mobiltelefoni are network operators with very small 
market shares, Tele2 and TDC – Song are virtual operators renting capacity 
from Telenor Mobil. Mobile termination rates in Norway are currently 
roughly 10 times higher than the termination rate on fixed networks. 
In Sweden the national regulator has committed to introduce reciprocal 
termination rates between all mobile networks. The regulated reciprocal 
mobile termination rate in Sweden is below the lowest mobile termination 
rate in Norway. This is in contrast to Denmark where mobile termination 
rates are currently not regulated. The Danish mobile termination rates are 
reciprocal and relatively high (above 1 DKR/min). The mobile market in 
Denmark is characterised by aggressive competition, low prices and low 
profits for the mobile firms. The experience from Denmark therefore lends 
some support to the assertion that it is reciprocity rather than the level of the 
termination rates that stimulates competition.  
3.2. Interconnection in the internet 
Interconnection on the internet is arranged quite differently from telephony; 
it is a hierarchy. The hierarchy and the associated interconnection contracts 
have evolved as a result of market forces and are not the result of regulatory 
intervention. The Internet is accordingly an interesting case for comparison.  
The Internet is a set of interconnected data networks all using the same 
system of addresses and protocols enabling communication between users on 
the different networks. Interconnection is evidently a key element in this 
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architecture. There are two main types of interconnection arrangements in 
the Internet; peering and transit (see Kende 2002). The Internet hierarchy is 
divided into three levels or tiers. Each level is characterised by the types of 
interconnection agreements they are engaged in.  
Peering is a barter arrangement where two networks mutually agree to 
exchange traffic free of charge. The traffic being exchanged is between 
customers (of customers) on the two peering networks. Peering networks do 
not accept traffic to third parties (traffic from a peer to other peers). The 
other type of contract is transit where one network is paid to accept any 
traffic to and from its contract partner, i.e. also to third parties. With the 
terminology introduced earlier in this chapter, peering can be characterised 
as two-way access and transit is one-way access.  
At tier 1 of the hierarchy we find the global Internet backbones, such 
networks are only engaged in peering arrangements. At tier 2 we find 
networks with a mix of contracts, both peering (typically regionally) and 
buying transit from one or more of the tier 1 networks. Finally a tier 3 
network is not engaged in peering. An overview of the peering arrangements 
various networks are engaged in can be found at http://www.peeringdb.com/. 
There is unregulated, seemingly well functioning, competition at each level 
in this hierarchy. Local access is however an exception. Local loop 
unbundling as well as other measures are used by regulators to facilitate 
competition at this level too. However, in 1998 two tier 1 networks, MCI 
and WorldCom merged. The merger would result in a significant increase in 
market concentration among tier 1 networks. Both European and US 
regulators approved the merger under the condition that the Internet business 
of MCI was divested (see FCC 1998, Cremer et al. 2000 and Economides 
2005). 
3.3. Internet-based applications 
The Internet enables ubiquitous data connectivity. Thus any pair of users can 
in principle communicate, but they need interoperable applications to 
facilitate this communication. E-mail is an example of an application (or 
service) running over the internet such that any e-mail user can communicate 
with any other e-mail user. This is in contrast to other communications 
services provided over the internet where interconnection is an issue. 
The necessary architecture for providing messenger6 services and voice over 
the Internet (VoIP) has some important similarities. In both cases servers7 
                                                     
6 A messenger platform enables users to engage in text-based real time dialogues 
over the Internet. 
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contain databases linking user names (or phone numbers) to IP addresses 
such that a user who is logged on can be reached irrespective of physical 
location. When a communication session is initiated the servers feed address 
information to the necessary systems such that the actual media stream (e.g. 
the voice call) is not passing through the server.  
Technically, direct interconnect between networks requires servers to be able 
to “talk to each other” in order to exchange address information. 
Furthermore, end systems have to be sufficiently compatible (e.g. that the 
technology for transferring voice to IP packets and back are interoperable).  
InternetServer 1 Server 2
a b c d
 
Figure 4, Real time communication on the internet 
In the figure above we have illustrated two telephony networks on the 
Internet. User a and b as well as server 1 belong to network 1. When user a 
makes a call to user b, the software on the originating computer will 
communicate with the call-server in order to obtain the necessary address 
information. Provided with this information, the software on computer a 
establishes direct contact with the software on computer b and the actual call 
takes place. The call itself does not pass through the server. 
As compared to traditional telephony, the entry barriers for providing 
services over the internet are relatively low. A newcomer wanting to offer 
e.g. VoIP must establish a call-server, and distribute necessary software to 
end users. Thus local access is no longer a bottleneck. Referring to the 
illustration above, users on network 1 and 2 can already communicate, e.g. 
by e-mail. The problem is however finding the address of the one you want 
                                                                                                                            
7 For instant messaging and telephony the servers are called IM servers and call-
servers respectively. The server functionality may be physically distributed, but 
logically it works as a database.  
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to communicate with. Thus the servers must exchange information in order 
to facilitate interconnection. With the introduction of VoIP a possible new 
bottleneck is accordingly access to these databases. In addition technical 
compatibility can be used strategically to gain competitive advantage. The 
examples provided below demonstrate that denying interconnection of 
databases as well as incompatible technical solutions indeed are an issue in 
these markets.  
The four large global messenger networks are: MSN Messenger, Yahoo! 
Messenger, AIM and ICQ. Two of the networks are owned by AOL; AIM 
and ICQ. These two networks are interconnected. This is in contrast to the 
other networks. At the time of writing, neither MSN nor Yahoo! offers 
interconnect to other messenger networks. A user of MSN can accordingly 
not communicate with a user of ICQ etc. In 1999 Microsoft did try to 
establish interconnection between MSN Messenger and AIM. The attempts 
were blocked by AOL which still has a dominant position in this market. 
Recently it has been announced that MSN and Yahoo! are going to be 
interconnected during the first half of 2006.8 Interconnection is evidently a 
strategic issue for these firms. 
Telephony networks based on VoIP are rapidly gaining market shares. 
Roughly 5% of Norwegian households were connected to a VoIP network as 
of 1 January 2005. This number is expected to rise to 20% during 2006. The 
situation in the VoIP market has similarities to the messenger market, and 
most VoIP networks are accordingly not directly interconnected.9 Some 
VoIP networks like Skype have managed to enter the telephony market 
without interconnecting with other networks. Other VoIP networks are 
taking a more traditional route by installing a gateway to the established 
circuit switched telephony networks (a relatively successful example in 
Norway is Telio).10 By doing so the entire installed base of telephony users 
on both fixed and mobile becomes available from VoIP. Since many VoIP 
networks have a gateway to the traditional telephony network, they are also 
indirectly interconnected. Thus instead of routing a call between VoIP 
customers on different networks directly over the Internet, the call is routed 
                                                     
8 See http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/oct05/10-
12MSNYahooMessengerPR.mspx  
9 There are some notable exceptions, in particular the US-based network Free world 
dialup. According to their website, their customers can use FWD to talk with people 
who use other networks to make calls over the internet. 
10 In addition to the components illustrated in figure 4, interconnection with the 
circuit switched network also requires a gateway. 
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via gateways and through the traditional telephony networks. This is 
illustrated by the dotted line below. 
InternetServer 1 Server 2
a b c d
Traditional telephony network
Gateway 1 Gateway 2
 
Figure 5, A call routed via the traditional telephony network 
This way of facilitating interconnection between different VoIP networks 
seems inefficient. By interconnecting call-servers and making software 
sufficiently compatible the call could instead be routed directly over the 
Internet. As the proportion of customers on VoIP increases, and thus the 
proportion of VoIP to VoIP calls increases, the significance of the 
inefficiency will increase. 
There are therefore likely to be gains from direct interconnection. A possible 
future development is then that some firms will deny all kinds of direct 
interconnection, others will want to interconnect with all others, while a third 
group of networks will choose targeted degradation. It is accordingly not 
unlikely that interconnection will continue to be an issue for regulators. The 
focus will however shift from local access towards access to address 
information (i.e. interconnection of servers) as well as compatibility and 
standardization.  
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3.4. Infrastructure sharing in mobile, national roaming 
In most industrialised countries, mobile firms are upgrading their networks 
to 3G.11 The cost of obtaining a given geographical coverage is much higher 
for 3G as compared to 2G. Thus the cost of introducing 3G is significant. 
Competing networks are rolling out networks in parallel. Potential gains 
from cooperation at the investment stage are therefore evident.  
Internationally there is considerable variation with respect to whether mobile 
firms cooperate in this dimension. Sweden is a particularly interesting case.12 
In December 2000 four 3G licenses were issued in Sweden based on a 
beauty contest. All the firms being awarded a license promised very 
aggressive network investments.13 The dominating firm, Telia, was not that 
aggressive and was accordingly not granted a license. Soon after the licenses 
were issued, Telia formed a joint venture with the second largest mobile 
firm, Tele2. The joint venture, called Svensk UMTS nät AB, is now rolling 
out a 3G network based on the license awarded to Tele2. Both Telia and 
Tele2 offer 3G services to end users based on capacity from the joint 
network. The Swedish Competition Authority (2002) approved the 
cooperation under a set of conditions. The approval is time limited up until 
February 2007. The Swedish case implies an extreme level of cooperation at 
the investment stage. Less extreme examples of cooperation are Germany 
and the UK. Taking Germany as an example, the European Commission14 
has approved the sharing of sites and also national roaming for a limited time 
period.  
The Commission, in its decision on roaming in Germany, as well as the 
competition authorities in Sweden15 try to balance gains from cooperation 
against the possible adverse effects on competition in the end-user market. In 
both cases the approval of cooperation is time limited. From the decisions on 
UK and Germany it is quite explicit that the firms will not be allowed to 
                                                     
11 The standard for 3G mobile networks being deployed in Europe is called UMTS; 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, whereas GSM (Global System for 
Mobile Communications) is the 2G standard. 
12 See Hultén et al. (2001) for a description of the 3G license process in Sweden 
13 As an example, according to Hultén et al Europolitan and HI3G planned to build 
700 base stations a month. 
14 See European Commission 2003 
15 See Swedish Competition Authority 2001 
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cooperate on roaming after the approval expires. This is in contrast to 
Sweden.  
4. Modelling issues 
In this section we will discuss some modelling issues of importance when 
analysing competition between networks. These issues are related to network 
externalities and their implications. 
4.1. Externalities and the generalised price of 
communication 
Consider a consumer with N potential communication partners (friends, 
family, colleagues etc.). Let qi (i = 1,2,…N ) denote the volume of 
communication with partner i and let pi denote the quality adjusted 
generalized price of communication over the most efficient available 
network. The generalized price contains all relevant aspects of costs attached 
to communication, e.g. quality (oral, writing, face to face), cost of traveling 
(if communication is face to face), waiting (traditional mail), etc. Let u 
denote the net utility from communication; ( )[ ]∑−= iiN qpqqUu ,...max 1 . If consumer number i for some reason 
chooses to join a network with the effect that the generalized price goes 
down (up), then the net utility from communication will increase (decrease). 
This is a network externality since consumer i’s choice of joining a network 
or not affects the utility of consumer j. Note that this externality is also 
present in more generalized frameworks where the consumer also optimizes 
over which available network is being used each time. An indirect utility 
function is always decreasing in price. Prices are determined by the 
decisions of joining networks by other consumers. The presence of network 
externalities as such does not therefore depend upon restrictive assumptions 
used when modelling.  
Consider a simplified example where the intensity of communication is 
identical over all communication partners.16 Assume there are two networks 
available, mail and telephony, all communication partners are members of 
the mail network and some are also members of the telephony network. The 
generalised price of telephony is assumed to be lower than the price of mail. 
Then, for given generalised prices, the utility of a consumer can be written as 
                                                     
16 In this section we assume that if the generalized price is the same towards all 
communication partners, then the call quantity is also identical. In the literature this 
is called a uniform calling pattern, see Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a). 
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u(n), where n is the number of consumers that have joined the telephony 
network. This function is illustrated below: 
Network size
Utility
 
Figure 6, Utility as a function of network size 
This type of utility function is applied in a number of papers studying 
network externalities, see e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985, where it is assumed 
concave as illustrated above.  
In models of network competition based on the Laffont Rey and Tirole 
(1998a,b) framework, the externality function is assumed linear. Thus when 
the price of on- and off-net communication is differentiated or participation 
is partial (à la Dessein 2003) utility varies linearly with the number of 
consumers on the network. Under these assumptions, the total value of the 
network is proportional to the square of the network size. Thus one assumes 
that “Metcalfe’s law” is fulfilled.17 This property is by many considered 
unlikely to hold because consumers are heterogeneous. In Rohlfs (2005) 
section 2.4 it is argued that consumers indeed are heterogeneous and that the 
ones that are most communication intensive will join first. Rohlfs argues 
that: “the value of a network increases much less than proportionately to the 
square of the number of users”. A more realistic modelling of network 
effects where the utility function is concave in network size will however not 
necessarily qualitatively change the results from models on network 
competition. It is the incentives facing marginal consumers (the ones that are 
                                                     
17 According to Metcalfe’s law the value of a network increases proportionally to the 
square of the number of users. Bob Metcalfe is the inventor of Ethernet. 
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indifferent as to joining the network or not) that determine the size of a 
network. As a local approximation the utility function can be assumed linear. 
According to Rohlfs the slope of the utility function at the margin is below 
the average slope. Thus one has to be careful not to overstate network 
effects.  
4.2. Externalities and network competition 
Consider now a fairly standard model of network competition. There are two 
competing networks, there is full participation (consumers are on one or the 
other network), calling patterns are uniform, network effects are linear and 
the size of the market is normalized to unity. Let ip  and ipˆ  denote the price 
of making on- and off-net calls respectively, for consumers on network i (i 
=1, 2). Then the utility of being on network i can be written: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ii pp ˆ1 ωααω −+  
where α ∈ [0,1] is the size (= market share) of network i and ω() is an 
indirect utility function. Note that if the prices for on- and off-net calls are 
identical, then network externalities disappear. Consumers are indifferent as 
to the choice of network made by others. Consider now the case where 
ii pp >ˆ . Then net utility as a function of size of network i can be illustrated 
as below: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )iii ppp ˆˆ ωωαω −+
 
Figure 7, Linear network effects 
In the Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) framework it is assumed that the 
two competing networks are differentiated à la Hotelling. Consumer 
 17
preferences are assumed to be distributed uniformly on the unit interval, and 
the disutility from not consuming the most preferred variety is linear in 
distance from the location of preferences and the location of the chosen 
network. The net utility of joining network i located at xi for a consumer of 
type j, with preferences located at xj is accordingly: 
(1.)  ( ) ( ) ( ) iijii Txxtpp −−−−+ ˆ1 ωααω  
where t is the linear disutility of not consuming the most preferred brand 
(travelling cost) and Ti is a fixed fee charged by network i. Consider the net 
utility of a consumer joining a network located at 0. It can be decomposed in 
three terms, a constant independent of network size, network effects and 
travelling costs: ( ) ( ) ( )( ) αωωαω tppTp iiii −−+− ˆˆ , the terms depending 
on network size is illustrated below: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )ppp ˆˆ ωωαω −+
 
Figure 8, Net utility of the marginal consumer, decomposed 
As is well known from Hotelling type models, profits are driven by the 
degree of horizontal differentiation. The larger the travelling cost t the 
steeper is the line -tα and the higher are profits. In this kind of models, 
network effects have the same implication as if the travelling cost is reduced. 
It is the sum of travelling cost and network effects that explains the net 
utility for the marginal consumer. Thus comparing two equilibria; one with 
large network effects and one with small network effects, profits will be 
higher in the latter. This mechanism drives the results in one of the papers in 
the present thesis, Foros and Hansen (2001), as well as some results in Farell 
and Saloner (1992) and Gans and King (2001). In section 5.3 of this 
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introduction I will discuss our contribution in relation to the literature.  
4.3. Externalities and the choice of strategic variable 
Consider the net utility function (1.) above. We can define ( ) ( ) ( ) iiii TppV −−+= ˆ1 ωααω  as the surplus of joining network i. Then 
net utility can be written in two equivalent ways: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
iji
iijii
xxtV
Txxtpp
−−≡
−−−−+ ˆ1 ωααω
 
On the one hand it seems reasonable to assume that firms compete by setting 
prices, on the other hand, it may be more convenient to consider net utility as 
the choice variable.18 Since (indirect) utility is measured in money there 
seems to be a one-to-one relationship between price and utility. In Laffont 
Rey and Tirole (1998b) it is argued (p. 52): Again we are back to a single-
dimensional competition (competition in net surpluses or equivalently in 
fixed fees).” Armstrong (2002) however argues that this claim is not 
necessarily valid. When solving a model similar to the LRT model he states, 
in a footnote on page 359, that: “A subtle point is that one has to take care 
about the choice of strategic variables when network effects are present”. 
Armstrong does not elaborate on this point however, and it may be 
worthwhile to take a closer look at this issue.19 
Armstrong’s point can be illustrated by looking at a simplified20 version of 
the stage 2 game in Foros and Hansen (2001). The simplifications are done 
to save notation and focus on the main aspect. Let the utility of being 
connected to network i be: 
 ( ) iiiii pxxtkvU −−−−++= αα 1  
                                                     
18 See e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) 
19 The issue came to my attention when writing the paper on asymmetric costs and 
network competition. Since there were two equivalent ways of solving the same 
problem my idea was to check my calculations by doing both. I was not able to 
obtain the same result. 
20 The simplification being that we do not take vertical differentiation into account, 
i.e. the parameter θ is set equal to zero. Furthermore the parameter β is set to unity 
(the degree of network externalities). 
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where v is the stand alone value of the network service. In this model 
network effects are linear. Total network size is normalized to unity, αi is the 
market share of firm i, thus iα  is the value of being able to communicate 
with others on the same network. The parameter [ ]1,0∈k  measures the 
quality when consumers communicate with subscribers on the other 
network, thus ( )α−1k  is the utility from off-net communication.  
Then net utility is defined as the utility of consuming the product, minus the 
price: 
( ) iiii pkvV −−++= αα 1  
The market share functions are derived by identifying the location of the 
indifferent consumer:  
 ( )ji VVt −+= 2121α ,  
or alternatively, if price is the strategic variable as:  
 ( )( ) ( )jii ppkt −−−−= 12 121α . 
We assume that production costs are normalised to zero. When price is the 
strategic variable, firms maximise: ii pα . When net utility is the strategic 
variable we must substitute from the definition of net utility in order to 
eliminate price from the profit expression: 
 ( )( )iiii Vkv −−++ ααα 1 . 
4.3.1. Price as strategic variable 
The first order condition for maximised profits is: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) 012 12112 10 =−−−−+−−−⇔=+∂∂ pjpipiipipi i ppktpktpp α
α
 
where superscript p denotes that price is the strategic variable. In a 
symmetric equilibrium ( pj
p
i
p ppp === ,5.0α ) prices and profits 
become: 
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( )
( )
2
1
2
1
kt
ktp
p
p
−−=
−−=
π  
4.3.2. Net utility as strategic variable 
Maximising profits:  
 
( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 0
2
1
2
1121max =−−+−⇒−−+ iiiiiiiV tVktkVki ααααα  
In a symmetric equilibrium, net utility becomes: tVi −=1 . By inserting this 
expression back into the definition of net utility we find the equilibrium 
price and equilibrium profits:  
 
( )
4
1
2
2
1
1
kt
ktp
Vkp
V
V
iiii
−−=
−−=
⇔−−+=
π
αα
 
where superscript V denotes that net utility is the strategic variable.  
4.3.3. The two solutions compared 
First of all, it is apparent from the calculations above that equilibrium prices 
and profits depend upon whether price or net utility is the strategic variable. 
In the model above this is the case if k < 1, i.e. if the model exhibits network 
effects. Prices and profits are higher when net utility is the strategic variable.  
In order to investigate whether the difference is significant I have illustrated 
the best response functions numerically for the two solutions below:  
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Figure 9, The best response functions compared 
In this example the parameter values: t = 0.4, k = 0.8, have been used. The 
solid lines are best response functions when price is the strategic variable 
and the dotted lines are best response functions (in the pricing dimension) 
when net utility is the strategic variable. In the games we consider here the 
difference in outcome is significant, equilibrium prices are 0.2 and 0.3 
respectively.  
In the simple model we consider here, the parameter restrictions that ensure 
a shared equilibrium are: t > (1 – k). Numerical simulations have revealed 
that parameter combinations close to this boundary21 yields a large 
difference between the two equilibria relative to parameter restrictions well 
inside the boundary. 
When firms have net utility as a strategic variable they commit to a less 
aggressive behaviour. This becomes apparent if we look at the locus of the 
                                                     
21 One interpretation of the parameter restriction is that it assures that the network 
effect is not dominating the Hotelling differentiation. Thus the parameter restriction 
assures that the market share functions decrease in price.  
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best response functions at the previous page. For any price determined by the 
opponent, the best response price is higher in the game where net utility is 
the strategic variable as compared to the game where price is the strategic 
variable.  
Consider a game where firms offer a contract where the level of the fixed fee 
is a function of market share, i.e. iiii bAp α+=  where, in the notation of 
the model above parameters are set such that: ii VkvA −+=  and 
kbi −=1 . Then it becomes apparent that there is not a one-to-one 
relationship between pi and Vi since the price paid also depends on market 
share. Instead we can see that using net utility as a strategic variable is 
equivalent to using the parameter Ai as a strategic variable. Recall that 
network effects and horizontal differentiation have opposite effects on the 
willingness to pay for the marginal consumer as illustrated in figure 8 above. 
When net utility is used as a strategic variable the competing firms commit 
to neutralise the effect of market share on the willingness to pay by the 
marginal consumer. By doing so, profits increase.  
In the present thesis, the choice of strategic variable has impact on the 
solution in both the paper on cost asymmetries (paper 2) and the paper on 
internet competition (paper 3). In both cases price is used as the strategic 
variable. According to Armstrong (2002), this is (perhaps) the most plausible 
assumption.  
 
5. Summary of the dissertation 
In this section the abstracts of the four essays are reproduced. Furthermore, 
where relevant, recent results from the literature are related to the papers.  
5.1. Termination rates and fixed mobile substitution 
In this paper we consider fixed mobile substitution in a model of mobile 
network competition. We demonstrate that the termination rates are profit 
neutral if the size of the mobile sector is given. An implication of this result 
is that the mobile termination rate does not have an impact on profits in the 
mobile sector if all subscribers multihome. Furthermore, the termination rate 
is also profit neutral if there is fixed mobile substitution of a type where 
consumers change status from multihoming in fixed and mobile to a status 
where they singlehome in mobile. In situations where consumers multihome 
and there is a positive termination margin, mobile firms will set usage prices 
above perceived marginal cost.  
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Furthermore, if fixed mobile substitution results in an increased number of 
mobile subscribers, then the mobile termination rate will have an impact on 
profits in the mobile sector. The mechanism behind this result is that profits 
in the mobile sector are proportional to the size of the mobile sector. The 
size of the mobile sector is an increasing function of the net utility offered to 
mobile subscribers. This net utility is increasing in the termination rate 
because termination revenues are being passed on to consumers due to 
competition in the mobile sector. Thus the mobile termination rate will have 
an impact on profitability in the mobile sector if the size of the mobile sector 
is affected.  
In a mixed market situation where the size of the mobile sector is elastic and 
there are some subscribers multihoming, the two effects described above, 
will in combination result in two kinds of market distortions. In order to 
induce consumers to joint the mobile networks, mobile firms will set 
termination rates above cost. Then, given a margin on termination and the 
existence of multihoming subscribers, mobile firms will have an incentive to 
raise usage prices above perceived marginal cost in order to make 
multihomers substitute traffic originated in mobile for traffic originated in 
fixed because it results in increased termination revenues. 
The implication of the analysis in this paper is that there is a strong case for 
regulating mobile termination rates in the growth phases of mobile 
telephony, whereas there is less need for regulation in mature markets 
characterized by a stable size of the mobile sector. This seems to be the 
opposite of the approach taken by regulators in Europe, where mobile firms 
were free to set termination rates in the growth phase and where regulation is 
introduced once markets mature. The observed policy may however be 
explained by regulators wanting to stimulate the growth of the mobile sector. 
This policy is evidently resulting in reduced welfare (in the short run).  
 
5.2. Network Competition when Costs are 
Heterogeneous 
In this paper we study network competition when costs differ among two 
interconnected networks. We analyze the implications of three different 
principles for regulating termination fees when marginal costs differ. The 
first case we analyze is cost based in the sense that termination fees exactly 
reflect marginal costs. It is a standard result in the literature that usage prices 
then are determined at the optimal level. We demonstrate that with cost 
differences, equilibrium market shares are not optimal in this regime. The 
most efficient network is too small compared to a welfare maximizing 
solution. The reason is that with cost differences there is a tariff mediated 
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network externality. There is however no mechanism in the market that 
enables the efficient firm to internalise this effect. 
In the second regulatory regime we consider taxation and subsidisation 
respectively, of the two firms based on the number of subscribers as an 
addition to the cost based regulation of termination rates. By subsidising the 
low cost firm and/or imposing a tax on the high cost firm, the regulator can 
implement first best.  
In the third regime we investigate whether granting a termination mark-up to 
the low cost firm can improve the situation as compared to cost based 
regulation. We demonstrate that the mark-up has the desired effect on 
market shares; the low cost firm becomes bigger. Furthermore, we 
demonstrate that, starting from cost based regulation, welfare increases as a 
termination mark-up granted to the low cost firm is introduced. Thus it is 
welfare improving to let the efficient firm enjoy a (small) mark-up.  
.The results described above are derived within a model not taking into 
account that consumers may derive utility from receiving calls. If the 
opposite is the case, then consumers, in their choice of network, also will 
take into account how much it will cost for others to call them. Thus, taking 
receiver utility into account, it may result in a reduced welfare loss due to the 
low cost firm being to small under cost based regulation. Asymmetric 
models with receiver utility is not possible to solve analytically according to 
Hoernig (2006).  
Jeon, Laffont and Tirole (2004) analyse a model of network competition 
with symmetric costs where consumers also derive utility from receiving 
calls. They demonstrate that if the utility of receiving calls is identical to the 
utility from originating calls, then networks will set infinitely high off net 
prices. The result is connectivity breakdown. The mechanism driving this 
result is that the competing firms attempt to offer a bundle superior to their 
competitor. When the utility of receiving calls is significant, the utility of 
customers in the competing network increase fast in the volume of off-net 
traffic. Thus by increasing the off net price customers on the other network 
is “punished”. The pricing structures observed in the telephony market with 
relatively moderate on-net off-net differentiation is accordingly not 
consistent with a large utility of receiving calls. 
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5.3. Competition and compatibility among Internet 
Service providers 
Information Economics and Policy 13 (2001) 411–425 
Co-authored with Øystein Foros, Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration  
We consider a two-stage game between two competing Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs). The firms offer access to the Internet. Access is assumed to 
be vertically and horizontally differentiated. Our model exhibits network 
externalities. In the first stage the two ISPs choose the level of compatibility 
(i.e. quality of a direct interconnect link between the two networks). In the 
second stage the two ISPs compete à la Hotelling. We find that the ISPs can 
reduce the stage 2 competitive pressure by increasing compatibility due to 
the network externality. The firms will thus agree upon a high compatibility 
at stage 1. When it is costly to invest in compatibility, we find that the firms 
overinvest, as compared to the welfare maximising investment level. 
Competing firms will accordingly have incentives to reduce network effects 
by decreasing the on – off net quality differential. Similar insight was to my 
knowledge first developed by Farrell and Saloner (1992). Farrell and Saloner 
analyse competition between two technologies. Both technologies are 
characterized by network effects, and if the technologies are compatible or 
there are converters available, network effects will also flow across the 
networks. They assume full participation, thus if converters are costless and 
perfect, network effects disappear similar to the case in our paper when there 
is no on-net, off-net quality differentiation. Under duopoly Farrell and 
Saloner find that profits increase in the quality of the converter. In the 
absence of converters, the equilibrium derived by Farrell and Saloner is 
symmetric. This is in contrast to the conversion equilibrium which is 
asymmetric. Due to a mechanism outside the Farrell Saloner model, 
consumers expect one of the two technologies to become dominant. 
Consumers buying the dominant technology do not buy a converter, whereas 
consumers buying the dominated technology also buy a converter.22 With 
respect to converters, both firms want converters to have a high quality. The 
                                                     
22 In the Farrell Saloner model, a conversion equilibrium cannot be symmetric. 
Consider a consumer with strong preferences for one of the technologies. If 
consumers on the other technology buy converters, the best response is not to buy a 
converter, and vice versa. In equilibrium the market share of the dominant 
technology exceeds the market share of the dominated technology.  
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dominant firm wants converters to be expensive, whereas the dominated firm 
wants them to be cheap. There are some notable differences between our 
model and the Farrell Saloner model. In contrast to Farrell and Saloner, we 
consider vertical differentiation, suppliers share the cost of compatibility, 
and this functionality is bundled into the product.  
Roson (2002) dedicates an entire paper to comparing our paper on 
interconnection on the internet to a paper by Cremer et al. (2000) on the 
same issue. Both papers discuss the incentives to interconnect on the internet 
but arrive at opposite conclusions. Cremer et al. find that dominant firms 
may have incentives to degrade interconnection. There are a number of 
differences with regard to assumptions between the two papers. Roson 
argues that the difference in conclusions is primarily driven by different 
assumptions regarding market size. We assume that the size of the total 
market is given whereas Cremer et al. assumes that market size is a function 
of prices. As demonstrated in another paper in this thesis (the paper on fixed 
mobile substitution) the incentives to interconnect are indeed dependent 
upon whether total market size is given or not. Cremer et al. however also 
assume that there are two groups of consumers; captured consumers, not 
responding to price changes, and a group of noncaptured consumers 
responding to price changes. Economides (2005) analyzes the implication of 
the assumed captured customers. He demonstrates that if all consumers 
respond to price changes, i.e. that the number of captured consumers is zero, 
then the conclusions of Cremer et al. change, and they become in line with 
the result in our paper: Networks have a common interest in assuring a high 
interconnection quality.  
5.4. Demand-side Spillovers and Semi-collusion in the 
Mobile Communications Market 
Journal of Industry Competition and Trade, 2002, 2, (3), pp. 259-278 
Co authored with Øystein Foros, Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration and Jan Yngve Sand, University of Tromsø 
We analyze roaming policy in the market for mobile telecommunications. 
Firms undertake quality improving investments in network infrastructure in 
order to increase geographical coverage, capacity in a given area, or 
functionality. Prior to investments, roaming policy is determined. We show 
that under collusion at the investment stage, firms’ and a benevolent welfare 
maximizing regulator’s interests coincide, and no regulatory intervention is 
needed. When investments are undertaken non-cooperatively, firms’ and the 
regulator’s interests do not coincide. Contrary to what seems to be the 
regulator’s concern, firms would decide on a higher roaming quality than the 
regulator. The effects of allowing a virtual operator to enter are also 
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examined. Furthermore, we discuss some implications for competition 
policy with regard to network infrastructure investment. 
In their review article on Wireless communications, Gans et al. (2005) base 
their discussion of the implications of national roaming on results from our 
paper.  
The quality improvement stemming from investments in mobile networks 
can take the form of improved capacity and/or improved coverage. Our 
paper focuses on capacity. This is in contrast to Valletti (2003) where the 
emphasis is on coverage as a means to vertical differentiation. The duopoly 
equilibrium in the Valletti model is characterised by maximum 
differentiation. One firm chooses maximum coverage, the other chooses 
minimum coverage (minimum coverage is typically specified in the license). 
In the Valletti model, national roaming is unprofitable for the firms. Thus 
roaming is only profitable if the firms collude. This result is in contrast to 
our paper. In their review article Gans et al. (2005) argue that the Valletti 
result is due to simplifying assumptions.23 Furthermore, observed market 
behaviour indicates that mobile firms tend to set similar coverage. 
The market experience reviewed in chapter 3.4 in this introduction revealed 
that mobile firms in several countries indeed cooperate over roaming and 
investments. Furthermore, the regulating authorities, given a set of 
conditions, have approved the cooperation. Given the approach taken by the 
regulating authorities an interesting issue to analyse would be the 
implications of allowing cooperation only in a limited time period. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The tension between cooperation and competition is not a transitory 
phenomenon during a deregulatory process. Even under full facility-based 
competition there is a potential gain from interconnecting networks. In 
section 3 of this introduction I have argued that interconnection is an issue 
for “old” as well as “new” services. The four papers in the present thesis 
indicate that the costs and benefits of interconnection and thus the incentives 
to interconnect change with technology and market characteristics. There is 
accordingly a need for a case by case analysis when assessing the need for 
regulatory intervention in such markets.  
                                                     
23 Gans et al. (2005, page 270) argue that the Valletti result is due to the assumed 
pure vertical differentiation. If there is horizontal differentiation in addition to the 
vertical differentiation, then firms may set identical coverage and instead compete in 
other dimensions.  
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Abstract: 
In this paper we consider fixed mobile substitution in a model of mobile 
network competition. We demonstrate that the profit neutrality result from 
the standard model of network competition (Laffont Rey Tirole1998a) holds 
if the number of mobile subscribers is given. Thus the mobile termination 
rate does not have an impact on profits in the mobile sector in a mature 
market where all consumers are hooked up to a mobile network and fixed 
mobile substitution results in subscribers disconnecting from the fixed 
network. However, if fixed mobile substitution results in an increased 
number of subscribers in mobile networks, then the mobile termination rate 
will have an impact on profits in the mobile sector. The implication of the 
analysis is that there is a case for regulating mobile termination rates in the 
growth phase, whereas there is less need for regulation in mature markets 
characterized by a stable size of the mobile sector. This seems to be the 
opposite of the approach taken by regulators in Europe, where mobile firms 
were free to set termination rates in the growth phase and regulation of 
termination rates is introduced once markets mature. 
                                                     
∗ I would like to thank Christian Riis and Øystein Foros for valuable comments to 
earlier versions of this paper.  
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1. Introduction 
The demand for telephony services is derived from the need for 
communication. This communication will take place either from a fixed or a 
mobile phone. Intuitively one would accordingly expect fixed and mobile 
telephony to be substitutes. The implications of fixed mobile substitution on 
the regulation of mobile termination rates should thus be taken into account. 
To do this we extend the model of network competition due to Laffont Rey 
and Tirole (1998a) by adding a fixed network. We show that a necessary 
condition for the profit neutrality of mobile termination rates is that the size 
of the mobile sector is given. If, on the other hand, the size of the mobile 
sector is elastic, i.e. the growth phase of mobile telephony, then the mobile 
firms can increase their profits by raising the termination rate. 
There is empirical evidence supporting the notion that fixed and mobile 
services are substitutes, see Cadima and Barros (2000) and Gruber and 
Verboven (2001b). There are however also examples of studies finding that 
fixed and mobile services are complements, e.g. Gruber and Verboven 
(2001a). According to a review article by Gans King and Wright (2005), the 
measured complementarity may be explained by network effects in the early 
phases with relatively few mobile subscribers. They argue that fixed and 
mobile services are likely to be substitutes in the mature phases of the life 
cycle of mobile telephony.  
In order to obtain telephony connectivity, networks have to be 
interconnected, i.e. two-way access is required. Under the widespread 
principle of calling party pays, the interconnecting networks both buy and 
sell termination services. The termination service is accordingly an input to 
other phone companies, both fixed and mobile. The literature on 
interconnection of symmetric networks, i.e. mobile to mobile termination, 
starting with the papers by Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a) as well as the 
paper by Armstrong (1998) is inconclusive with respect to whether 
interconnecting, competing firms have incentives to set termination rates 
above the welfare maximizing level. The results depend upon the pricing 
structure in the downstream market. The result that interconnected networks 
do not necessarily have incentives to set termination rates above the welfare 
maximizing level is in contrast to the results in the literature on fixed to 
mobile termination. Fixed companies are typically former monopolies and 
they are subject to regulation. The argument is that fixed companies do not 
have any bargaining power when negotiating termination rates due to 
regulation. Thus mobile firms have incentives to raise termination rates 
above the welfare maximizing level in order to extract profits from the fixed 
sector (see e.g. Armstrong 2002 p. 339 and Wright 2002). A review of 
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results on fixed to mobile termination can be found in de Bijl et al. (2004). 
None of these papers consider the implications of fixed mobile substitution. 
The results cited above for mobile to mobile termination and fixed to mobile 
termination respectively are not derived within the same modelling 
frameworks. From the outset it is accordingly not evident whether the 
differences in conclusions with respect to the incentives to set termination 
rates survive within a model studying both issues simultaneously.  
We consider a model where competing mobile firms set a termination rate 
that also applies to the fixed network. In the paper we demonstrate that the 
mobile firms pass termination revenues on to their subscribers due to 
competition in the mobile sector. On the one hand, the passing on of 
revenues implies that the profit neutrality result from the network 
competition literature (first derived in Laffont Rey and Tirole 1998a) still is 
valid given that the number of subscribers on mobile networks is given. On 
the other hand, the passing on of revenues implies that if the demand for 
mobile subscriptions is elastic, i.e. consumers substitute mobile for fixed, 
then mobile firms have incentives to raise their termination rate above the 
welfare maximizing level in order to attract more subscribers. In a mobile 
market in growth (“emerging market”) mobile firms can accordingly 
increase profits by raising the termination rate, whereas in a saturated mobile 
market (“mature market”) the profit neutrality of termination rates holds. To 
our knowledge, our analysis of fixed mobile substitution as well as 
multihoming is novel. 
In the present paper we allow for multihoming, we analyze the effect of 
fixed and mobile services being substitutes in consumption and we assume 
non discriminatory termination rates, i.e. that mobile firms charge the same 
termination fee regardless of whether the traffic is originated in a fixed 
network or a mobile network. To fix ideas we can think of two competing 
mobile firms negotiating a reciprocal termination fee,1 and then due to the 
non discrimination assumption apply the same termination rate towards the 
fixed network. Interconnection is illustrated below: 
                                                     
1 We assume that the reciprocal mobile termination fees are determined in 
negotiations between mobile firms, or by the regulator. The outcome of (symmetric) 
mobile firms setting termination rates non-cooperatively is also reciprocity as 
demonstrated by Gans and King (2001). However, when termination rates are 
determined non-cooperatively, Gans and King demonstrate that equilibrium level is 
high relative to the outcome under cooperative determination of termination rates. 
In many jurisdictions, regulators set the mobile termination rates. Regulated rates 
are reciprocal in some countries and non reciprocal in others. 
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Figure 1, Termination and non discrimination 
In the illustration above the reciprocal mobile to mobile termination fee is 
denoted a. The fixed network has to pay the same termination fee to both 
mobile networks. Furthermore, af denotes the termination fee charged by the 
fixed network. In European markets the mobile to mobile termination fees 
are typically 5 to 10 times higher than the termination fee charged by fixed 
networks. This is contrary to the US where reciprocal fixed to mobile 
termination rates are observed.  
The assumed non discrimination is common among mobile operators (see de 
Bijl et al. 2004 p 108). This assumption is critical for our results and can be 
motivated in two ways; due to regulation and/or arbitrage. In many 
jurisdictions (e.g. most of the EU) non discrimination is mandatory on the 
termination market; i.e. mobile firms are not allowed to price discriminate 
based on whether the calls are originated in a fixed or a mobile network. 
Furthermore, suppose discrimination is allowed, then calls from the network 
facing the high termination charge can be routed via a network facing a low 
termination fee and thus the price discrimination is bypassed.2  
The current paper is organized as follows. In section 2 of the paper we 
reproduce the reference model, i.e. a model of network competition with two 
part tariffs in the downstream market. Within the reference model we 
demonstrate that the profit neutrality result also holds if we add a fixed 
                                                     
2 In the industry this type of bypass is called refiling. In Norway we had a case of 
refilling in 1999 – 2000, because the mobile firms had differentiated “domestic” 
and “international” termination fees. The international termination fees were below 
the domestic and calls were routed via Sweden in order to be subject to the lower 
international termination fee. Due to this bypass the differentiation of termination 
fees was abandoned.  
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network of exogenous size. In section 3 of the paper we present our model of 
network competition and fixed mobile substitution. Then we proceed in 
section 4 by analyzing two types of market equilibriums, full multihoming 
and full singlehoming respectively. Finally in section 6 we conclude the 
paper. In appendix B we characterize two more possible equilibriums. 
 
2. Adding an exogenous fixed network to the 
standard model of network competition 
Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a) presented a model with Hotelling type 
differentiation between two mobile firms where the networks charge two 
part tariffs. A striking result from this model is the profit neutrality of 
reciprocal termination charges. In this section of the paper we will add a 
fixed network of exogenous size to a model of the Laffont Rey Tirole type. 
This model will serve as a benchmark and a motivation for the models where 
we take fixed mobile substitution into account.  
The mobile market is assumed to have a given size normalized to unity. 
Subscribers are assumed to single home, calling patterns are assumed to be 
uniform and the two competing mobile networks charge two part tariffs. The 
networks are differentiated à la Hotelling. Network preferences are assumed 
to be uniformly distributed on the unit line, and the differentiation is 
assumed exogenous. The utility for a subscriber of type x connected to 
network i is given by: 
 ii xxvV −−+ σ2
1
0  
Where ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]iiiiii pqqupTpV −=−= max and ωω , is the net utility 
from network subscription, q is the number of calls being made, ( )qu  is the 
utility form making calls and iT  is the fixed part of the two part tariff 
(subscription fee). Furthermore, 0v  is the stand alone value of subscription 
to a mobile network, x1 (=0,1) is the locus of the two networks. The disutility 
from not consuming an offering of the preferred type is σ21 . Market shares, 
iα , are determined by the subscriber being indifferent as to the two 
offerings, thus: 
 ( )jii VV −+= σα 21  
 6
In this section we simplify the modelling by assuming that fixed subscribers 
make calls to the mobile subscribers, but mobile subscribers do not make 
calls to the fixed network. 3 
We assume that the volume of incoming calls per mobile subscriber from the 
fixed network is a decreasing (non increasing) function of the termination 
rate a: ( )aqq 00 = . Given a market share of iα , mobile firm i will then 
receive incoming F2M traffic: ( )aqi 0α . Then we can write profit of mobile 
firm i:  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )0000 capqcacppqcaaqT jjijiiiii −+−−−+−+= ααααπ
. 
Where c is the unit price of producing a call, and 0c  is the cost of 
terminating a call.4 We use net utility as the strategic variable. Thus we 
substitute: ( ) iii VpT −=ω . Furthermore we define ( ) ( )( )00 caaqaR −≡  as 
the per subscriber net revenue from incoming calls from the fixed network. 
Then the profit function can be written:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )00 capqcacppqaRVp jjijiiiiii −+−−−++−= αααωαπ
 
This function is to be maximized with respect to marginal price p and net 
utility V. For given net utilities market shares are given and we obtain the by 
now familiar result:  
(1.) ( )00 cacpp jii
i −+=⇔=∂
∂ απ  
Net profit from carrying traffic is accordingly zero. Consider next: 0=∂
∂
i
i
V
π
, 
substituting for usage pricing at marginal cost and then solving with respect 
to Vi yields: 
                                                     
3 This assumption simplifies the modelling without changing the main insights, later 
on in the paper we will consider a richer model.  
4 In contrast to the Laffont Rey Tirole model, we do not include fixed cost per 
subscriber nor volume dependent costs in the transmission network. These 
parameters are not the focus of the current paper. 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )00 21 capqcapqaRpV ijiiiii −−+−+++−= ααωσα  
In a symmetric equilibrium ( jii pp == ,5.0α ), the expression above 
simplifies to: 
(2.) ( ) ( ) ( )( )02
1
2
1 capqaRpV iii −+++−= ωσ  
Optimal pricing and optimal net utility can be substituted back into the profit 
function and then we obtain: 
 σπ 4
1=i  
Hence profits are unaffected by the termination charge. Under Hotelling 
competition, any revenue (loss) from termination is passed on to consumers 
(see 2.).  
Prior to the market game analyzed above, the mobile firms may negotiate a 
reciprocal termination charge. Since profits are unaffected, mobile firms are 
indifferent with respect to the level of this termination charge and they will 
(weakly) prefer to set it at the welfare maximizing level. A positive margin 
on termination to mobile networks will thus result in transfers from fixed to 
mobile subscribers.  
Wright (2002) as well as Armstrong (2002) analyze the effects of mobile 
termination rates in a model with an exogenous fixed network of the type 
considered in above. In contrast to our result, both conclude that the mobile 
sector can increase profits by raising the termination rate. Wright (2002) is 
however also deriving a similar result to ours, but he argues that it is a 
special case. He focuses on cases where mobile firms set termination rates 
individually towards the fixed sector and/or situations with a less 
competitive mobile sector. Armstrong (2002), (p. 337 and onwards) also 
analyzes the implications of mobile firms setting fixed to mobile termination 
rates individually, but he assumes perfect competition in the mobile sector.  
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3. A model of network competition and fixed 
mobile substitution 
In this section we will describe the extensions made to the model in order to 
analyze the effects of fixed mobile substitution. 
3.1. Preferences in the fixed mobile dimension 
As argued in the introduction to this paper, there is reason to believe that 
fixed and mobile services are substitutes. 
Furthermore, in the market one can observe some consumers singlehoming 
in mobile, others singlehoming in fixed and some consumers multihoming in 
the sense that they subscribe to both fixed and mobile services. Taking 
Norway as an example, the number of mobile subscriptions exceeds the 
number of inhabitants5, and 83% of all households are hooked up to the fixed 
network. Most people in Norway are accordingly multihoming.6 
Furthermore, there seems to be a trend that consumers disconnect from the 
fixed network and become singlehomers in mobile. This phenomenon is 
called fixed mobile substitution.7 Some predicts that this development will 
accelerate.  
Our modelling of preferences in the fixed mobile dimension takes as its 
starting point that consumers differ in the degree that they are on the move. 
Some consumes are at fixed locations almost all the time and thus close to a 
fixed phone. Such consumers are assumed to have relatively low willingness 
to pay for mobile services. This is in contrast to people being mostly on the 
move. Such consumers have to rely on the mobile phone to be able to 
communicate, thus they have relatively high willingness to pay for being 
connected to a mobile service. Since fixed services typically are 
considerably cheaper than mobile services some consumers may even find 
that they are best off by multihoming, i.e. by placing calls in the mobile 
network only when they are away from a fixed phone. 
In our model the total number of customers is normalized to unity. We let 
every consumer be characterized by two parameters, (x, y) uniformly and 
independently distributed on the unit square. x measures preferences in the 
mobile dimension, i.e. the locus of preferences on the Hotelling line in the 
same way as in the model reviewed above. y is a measure of preferences in 
                                                     
5 According to the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority there were 
104 mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants in Norway in 2005. 
6 June 2005, source: NPT 2005 
7 See also ITU 2003 
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the fixed mobile dimension. This parameter can be given a straightforward 
interpretation, a consumer of type ( )yx,  is on the move and thus away from 
a fixed phone a fraction of time equal to y . The unit square is illustrated 
below: 
(0,0) (0,1)
(1,0) (1,1)
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Figure 2, Product differentiation 
Consumers with taste parameters in the upper left corner are likely to 
connect to mobile network 1, consumers with taste parameters in the lower 
half of the square are likely to connect to the fixed network, etc. 
Note that differentiation between the two mobile services is assumed to be 
purely horizontal whereas the differentiation in the fixed to mobile 
dimension is purely vertical. Vertically differentiated mobile networks were 
analyzed by Carter and Wright 2003, as well as by Peitz 2005. As for the 
fixed mobile dimension, it seems reasonable to assume that fixed and mobile 
services are vertically differentiated since a mobile phone gives the 
opportunity of communication in fixed locations as well as the opportunity 
to communicate while being on the move. Some may however argue that 
there is an element of horizontal differentiation since mobile services are 
characterized by radiation, poorer sound quality and hassle related to 
charging batteries. Thus, alternatively one could model horizontal 
differentiation in the fixed to mobile dimension as well. Altering the 
modelling in the present paper by assuming Hotelling type horizontal 
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differentiation in the fixed to mobile dimension yields qualitatively identical 
results.  
A consumer of type (x, y) single homing on mobile network i is assumed to 
receive utility: 
(3.) ( ) ( ) iii Tygxxp −+−− σω 2
1
 
The only difference from the utility function we considered in section 2 of 
the paper is that we have substituted the fixed term 0v  for a type dependent 
term, g(y) capturing the preferences for mobile services.8 We assume that ( ) 0>′ yg .  
The fixed network is assumed to be regulated in both the up- and 
downstream market, and the usage price on fixed is assumed to be an 
increasing function of the termination rate that the fixed network has to pay 
to mobile networks. The fixed network charges a single two-part tariff 
without discriminating between fixed to fixed and fixed to mobile traffic. 
Thus the indirect utility of a subscriber singlehoming in the fixed network 
(notation related to the fixed network has subscript f throughout the paper) 
can be written: 
(4.) ( ) ( ) 0, ≤′−= ffff VTaaV ω  
Finally, multihoming subscribers will place calls from the fixed network as 
well as calls from one of the mobile networks. These calls are terminated in 
fixed and mobile networks proportionally to the respective market shares in 
the same way as assumed in the reference model considered in section 2. A 
multihoming subscriber is assumed to derive gross utility from making calls; ( )fqqU ˆ,ˆ , where qˆ  is the quantity of calls originated in the mobile network 
and fqˆ  is the quantity of calls originated in the fixed network.9 The 
multihoming consumer will optimize call consumption resulting in an 
indirect utility function; ( ) ( )[ ]fffqq qpqpqqUap fi ˆˆˆ,ˆmax,ˆ ,ˆ −−=ω . Thus the 
                                                     
8 Recall that the parameter y is measuring the fraction of time being away from a 
fixed phone. Thus, instead of adding a mobility premium to a mobile service one, an 
equivalent approach is to instead add a cost depending on y to the utility from fixed 
subscriptions.  
9 Throughout the paper, variables and functions with a hat are related to 
multihoming consumers, i.e. qˆ  is the quantity of mobile to mobile calls for 
multihoming subscribers and q  is the quantity of mobile to mobile calls made by 
singlehoming consumers.  
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utility of a subscriber of type (x, y) connected to mobile network i and to the 
fixed network is given by:  
(5.) ( ) ( ) fiii TTygxxap −−+−− ˆ2
1,ˆ σω  
i.e. the sum of the following terms: indirect utility from making calls, the 
disutility from not consuming the most preferred mobile brand, the type 
dependent utility from being a multihomer, and finally the fixed fees on the 
fixed network as well as a mobile network. Note that the type dependent 
utility from subscribing to mobile services for multihoming consumers ( )ygˆ  
may differ from the benefit of singlehoming in a mobile network. In the 
same way as for singlehomers, the willingness to pay for mobility is an 
increasing function of consumer type; ( ) 0ˆ >′ yg .  
Call demand functions for a subscriber multihoming in mobile network i and 
the fixed network are given by: 
( ) ( )
( ) 0ˆ,,ˆ
0
ˆ
,,
ˆ
,ˆ
≤∂
∂=
<∂
∂
∂
∂−==
a
q
paqq
p
q
p
apapqq
f
iff
i
i
i
i
iii
ω
  
Finally, we assume that traffic originated in fixed and traffic originated in 
mobile are substitutes, i.e.:  
 0≥∂
∂
i
f
p
q
 
Note that this assumption per se not is contradictory to fixed and mobile 
services being complements at an aggregate level. Consider the following 
example, in an uncovered market, a reduction in the fixed usage price will 
have two opposing effects; a direct substitution effect and an indirect 
network effect. The indirect network effect is due to some unsubscribing 
consumers joining the fixed network. This will again result in more potential 
communication partners, resulting in increased mobile usage. The aggregate 
effect may be that the network effect dominates the substitution effect such 
that fixed and mobile services appear to be complements.  
3.2. Timing of the games 
In this paper we endogenize the homing decisions made by subscribers, i.e. 
the choice between:  
a. Singlehoming in mobile 
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b. Multihoming in mobile and fixed 
c. Singlehoming in fixed 
In order to simplify the modelling we will assume that this homing decision 
is made prior to consumers learning their preferences over mobile services 
(the x parameter, location on the Hotelling line). By doing so the strategic 
interaction between the two mobile firms will be directly comparable to the 
reference model.10  
This timing structure is introduced in order to simplify the modelling, but it 
can be motivated by assuming that there is a search cost related to learning 
the characteristics of the mobile services. Suppose consumers only are 
willing to incur the cost of learning characteristics of the mobile services 
after the homing decisions are made; i.e. consumers first make their homing 
decision, and if the decision is to join a mobile network they start searching 
for the preferable offering.  
We assume that mobile termination rates are determined prior to the game 
we are analyzing. The termination rates are either a result of negotiations 
between the mobile firms or from regulation. Thus we consider the 
following multistage game: 
1. Consumers make their homing decision  
2. Consumers homing in mobile learn their preferences in the mobile 
dimension, i.e. the location of their preferences on the Hotelling line 
3. Mobile firms compete in two-part tariffs 
The outcome of stage 1 of the game may be a corner-solution where either 
all subscribers singlehome in fixed or mobile; alternatively we obtain a 
corner solution where all consumers multihome. The stage 1 outcome may 
also be an interior solution where some subscribers choose singlehoming in 
fixed or mobile, others choose multihoming. The game is solved by 
backward induction. Thus, in principle, one has to consider all possible stage 
1 outcomes. If all subscribers singlehome in mobile we are however back to 
the reference model. Furthermore, if all subscribers singlehome in fixed, the 
effect of termination rates vanishes since all traffic will be internal in the 
fixed network. These outcomes are not interesting in our context. Our focus 
is the implications of fixed mobile substitution and it turns out that it is 
sufficient to analyze two outcomes from stage 1 of the game: 1) The 
outcome where all consumers multihome in fixed and mobile, and 2) the 
                                                     
10 Without this assumption consumers located in the middle of the Hotelling line 
would be more likely to choose the fixed network. Then the strategic interaction in 
the standard Hotelling model changes. In particular, the change in market share as 
a result of changing prices takes a different (and more complicated) form. 
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outcome characterized by singlehoming, where subscribers are either on 
fixed or on mobile. In appendix B we also look into two other stage 1 
outcomes, namely: B.1.) “An emerging market” where all subscribers are on 
fixed and some subscribers multihome and B.2.) “A mature market” where 
all subscribers are on mobile, and some multihome in fixed and mobile.  
3.3. The homing decision 
The offered mobile services are located on the extremes of the unit line. 
Consumer preferences are uniformly distributed; thus expected traveling 
distance is 0.25. The expected disutility from not consuming the most 
preferred variety is accordingly σσ 8
1
4
1
2
1 = .  
 
Thus at stage 1 of the game a subscriber will choose to singlehome in fixed 
if this homing decision is preferred over both singlehoming in mobile (i) and 
multihoming (ii): 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) iif
iiff
Tygappii
TygpTpi
−+−≥
−+−≥−
ˆ
8
1,ˆ)
8
1)
σωω
σωω  
Similarly, a consumer will, at stage 1, prefer to singlehome in mobile over 
both singlehoming in fixed (i) and multihoming (ii): 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) fii
ffii
Tygapygpii
TpTygpi
−+≥+
−≥−+−
ˆ,ˆ)
8
1)
ωω
ωσω  
Finally, a consumer will prefer to multihome if: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ygpTygapii
pTygapi
ifi
fii
+≥−+
≥−+−
ωω
ωσω
ˆ,ˆ)
ˆ
8
1,ˆ)
 
Note that depending upon prices, the shape and locus of the indirect utility 
functions for singlehoming and multihoming consumers ωω ˆ,  as well as the 
shape and locus of the additional utility from mobility gg ˆ, , we may end up 
in scenarios where all subscribers make the same homing decisions or we 
may end up in mixed situations. As indicated above we will focus on two 
outcomes: 1) The outcome where all subscribers multihome, and 2) the 
outcome where some subscribers singlehome in mobile and others 
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singlehome in fixed. In the appendix we briefly look into other outcomes as 
well. 
4. All subscribers multihome 
In this section of the paper we will make the extreme assumption that the 
outcome of stage 1 of the game is that all subscribers choose to multihome. 
This is the case if at stage 1 of the game, all subscribers prefer multihoming 
over singlehoming in mobile; i.e. for all [ ]1,0∈y , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ygpTygap ifi +≥−+ ωω ˆ,ˆ  and they also prefer multihoming over 
singlehoming in fixed; i.e. for all [ ]1,0∈y , 
( ) ( ) ( )fii pTygap ωσω ≥−+− ˆ81,ˆ .  
4.1. Market shares 
Market shares of the two mobile firms are determined in the standard 
Hotelling way:  
( ) ( )( )jijii TTapap +−−+= ,ˆ,ˆ21 ωωσα  
 
4.2. Stage 3 
In the following we will without loss of generality focus on mobile firm 1, 
and to save notation we write 1αα = . Retail profits are: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]ααπ −−−−+= 1,ˆ 0111 cacpapqTR  
i.e. market share multiplied with the fixed fee plus profits on traffic. Note 
that we have made one important simplification in this section; when 
consumers originate a call in a mobile network, their call will also be 
terminated in a mobile network.11 
Consider then profits in the wholesale market. It consists of three elements: 
1. Calls from mobile network 2 terminated in network 1: ( ) ( ) ( )apqca ,ˆ1 20 αα −−  
                                                     
11 Since all subscribers multihome, all subscribers have a mobile phone, and since 
we assume that there is no price discrimination between traffic terminated in fixed 
and mobile, subscribers will (weakly) prefer to terminate calls on mobile phones. 
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2. Calls from multihoming subscribers in network 1 originated in fixed, 
terminating in mobile network 1: 
( ) ( )apqca f ,ˆ 1210 α−  
3. Finally calls from multihoming subscribers in network 2 originated 
in fixed, terminating in mobile network 1  ( ) ( ) ( )apqca f ,ˆ1 2110 αα −−  
We substitute ( ) 111 ,ˆ VapT −=ω , collect terms and obtain the following 
profit function:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−++−−+
−−−−+−=
apqapqapqca
cacpapqVap
ff
Vp ,ˆ1,ˆ,ˆ1
1,ˆ,ˆ
max
21
2
20
01111
,1 11 ααααα
αωαπ
 
This function is to be maximized with respect to net utility 1V  and usage 
price 1p . The first order conditions are:  
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0,ˆ21,ˆ2,ˆ21
21,ˆ,ˆ
0
,ˆ
1,
ˆ
2120
01111
1
1
1
1
0
2
01
1
1
1
1
=−++−−+
−−−−+−+−=∂
∂
=∂
∂−+−−−−∂
∂=∂
∂
apqapqapqca
cacpapqVap
V
p
apq
cacacp
p
apq
p
ff
f
ααασ
αωσαπ
αααπ
 
Consider first optimal usage price: 
 ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
001
1
1
,ˆ
,ˆ
10
p
apq
p
apq
cacacp
p
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
−−−−+=⇔=∂
∂ ααπ  
Proposition 1: 
As compared to a model without fixed mobile substitution, multihoming and 
fixed mobile substitution results in:  
• An upward adjustment of usage prices if the termination margin is 
positive. 
• A downward adjustment of usage prices if the termination margin is 
negative. 
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Proof: 
The result follows directly from fixed and mobile being substitutes, ( )
0
,ˆ
1
1 ≥∂
∂
p
apq f ; 
( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]0
1
1
1
1
0 sign,ˆ
,ˆ
sign ca
p
apq
p
apq
ca
f
−=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
∂
∂
∂
−−α  QED 
This result is in contrast to the result on usage pricing in the benchmark 
model in section 2 of this paper. Mobile firms deviate from pricing at 
perceived marginal cost when traffic originated in the fixed network is a 
substitute for traffic in the mobile network. This adjustment is increasing in 
the cross price effect and decreasing in the own price effect.  
Assume there is a positive termination margin, and take pricing at perceived 
marginal cost as a starting point, then a marginal increase in the usage price 
will result in two effects: 1) An increase in wholesale profits since 
consumers will increase the number of calls originated in the fixed network 
resulting in increased termination revenues. 2) A loss in retail profits since 
the subscription fee will have to be reduced in order to compensate for the 
loss in consumer surplus due to the increased usage price. The wholesale 
effect is a first order effect, whereas the effect on retail profits is a second 
order effect. When there is a termination margin the mobile firms will 
accordingly increase their profits by raising usage prices above the perceived 
marginal cost. A negative termination margin will result in the opposite 
adjustment in usage prices.  
Define: 
( )
( ) 0,ˆ
,ˆ
1
1
1
1
>
∂
∂
∂
∂
−≡
p
apq
p
apq f
δ  
In order to simplify the modelling, we will assume that δ is a constant.12 The 
condition for optimal usage price can then be written: 
                                                     
12 Fulfilled for linear demand functions 
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 ( )( ) ( )001 1 cacacp −+−−+= δαα  
Proposition 2: 
Reciprocal termination rates are profit neutral under full multihoming. 
Proof: 
Inserting optimal usage price in the condition for optimal net utility yields:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )apqapqapqapqca
apV
apqapqapqca
caapqVap
ff
ff
,ˆ,ˆ21,ˆ2,ˆ1
,ˆ
,ˆ21,ˆ2,ˆ21
1,ˆ,ˆ0
22110
11
2120
0111
+−+++−
++−=
−++−−+
−++−+−=
ααδα
ωσ
α
ααασ
δαωσα
 
In any symmetric equilibrium market shares = 0.5, thus we obtain 
equilibrium net utility: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )apqapqcaapV f ,ˆ,ˆ1,ˆ21 1121011 ++−++−= δωσ  
Finally, inserting equilibrium-, market shares, net utility and usage prices 
(where 21 pp = ) into the profit function yields: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) σ
δαα
δωσ
ωπ
4
1,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ
4
1
2
11,ˆ
2
1
,ˆ,ˆ1,ˆ
2
1
2
1
,ˆ
2
1
2120
0001
112
1
01
11
=++−+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−+−−++
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++−++−−
=
apqapqapqca
caccacacapq
apqapqcaap
ap
ff
f
 
QED 
 
Under full multihoming mobile firms cannot increase their profits by using 
the termination rate as a collusive device. The mechanism driving this result 
is the same as in the benchmark model considered in section 2. Termination 
revenues are passed on to consumers. Thus a margin on mobile termination 
will result in a reduction of the mobile fixed fees. This reduction is exactly 
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equal to the generated profits on termination. These profits are partly from 
fixed to mobile traffic and partly from incoming mobile to mobile traffic.  
 
5. Singlehoming 
In this section we will assume that all subscribers, at stage 1 of the game, 
have chosen to singlehome; i.e. all subscribers {x, y} are either characterized 
by preferring singlehoming in mobile over multihoming, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ygpTygap ifi +≤−+ ωω ˆ,ˆ  or they are characterized by ( ) ( ) ( )fii pTygap ωω σ ≤−+− ˆ,ˆ 81 , i.e. preferring singlehoming in fixed 
over multihoming.  
Thus in this section we assume that at stage 1 of the game a fraction of 
subscribers m, where ( )1,0∈m  has chosen to singlehome in a mobile 
network, and a fraction (1 – m) has chosen to singlehome in the fixed 
network.  
5.1. Stage 3 of the game 
A consumer singlehoming in the fixed network has utility ( ) ffff TpV −=ω , whereas a subscriber singlehoming in mobile network i 
has net utility ( ) iii TpV −=ω . The two mobile networks are competing over 
the m customers in the mobile segment. The market share of mobile firm 1 
of the mobile segment is accordingly: 
 ( ) ( )( )21212
1 TTpp +−−+= ωωσα  
Retail profit of firm 1 is now: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ]mcamcacppqTm fR −−−−−−−+= 11 00111 ααπ  
The difference from the formulation in the previous section is that all market 
shares are scaled by m, and we have included a term capturing the cost of 
traffic terminated in the fixed network, )( 0ca f −  where fa  denotes the 
regulated termination fee in the fixed network.13 We assume 0ca f ≤ , i.e. 
that the regulated termination fee in the fixed network is no larger than the 
                                                     
13 In the previous section we considered only multihoming consumers and then we 
simplified the modelling by assuming that all mobile originated traffic also 
terminated in mobile phones. Under singlehoming some traffic has to be terminated 
in fixed in order to allow for calls to the group of customers singlehoming in fixed.  
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cost of terminating calls in the mobile network. Consider then profits in the 
wholesale market. It consists of two elements: 
1. Calls from mobile network 2 terminated in network 1: ( ) ( ) ( )220 1 pqmca αα −−  
2. Calls originated in the fixed network terminated in mobile network 
1: ( ) ( ) ( )aqmmca 010 1 α−−  
As in the previous section we substitute ( ) 111 VpT −=ω , collect terms and 
obtain the following profit function: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−−+
−−−−−−−+−=
aqmpmqcam
mcamcacppqVpm f
Vp
020
001111
, 11
11
max
11 αα
αωαπ
 
Maximization with respect to usage price and net utility yields:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0121
121
011
020
001111
1
0011
1
=−+−−+
−−−−−−−+−+
−=∂
∂
=−−−−−−−′=∂
∂
aqmpmqcam
mcamcacppqVpm
m
V
mcamcacppqm
p
f
f
ασ
αωσ
απ
ααπ
 
Optimal usage price is accordingly: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )mcacamcp f −−+−−+= 11 001 α  
As compared to the reference model the usage price is adjusted to reflect the 
termination rate on fixed, but the result is similar in the sense that usage is 
priced at perceived marginal cost. Consider next optimal net utility, where 
we insert optimal usage price and obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )aqmpmqpmqcapV 021011 121 −+−+−++−= ααωσ
α
 
In a symmetric equilibrium we have ippp == 21  and 2
1=α , thus 
equilibrium net utility is: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )aqmpmqcapV 0121011 12
1 −+−++−= ωσ  
Proposition 3: 
Under singlehoming the profit in the mobile sector is proportional to the 
number of consumers in the mobile segment. 
Proof:  
Equilibrium profits are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
σ
ωσωπ
4
1
1
1
2
1
02
1
02
1
02
1
0112
1
m
aqmpmqcam
aqmpmqcappm
=
−+−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+−++−−=
 
QED 
Since profits increase with the size of the mobile segment it is interesting to 
analyze stage 1 of the game in order to study whether the termination rate 
has an impact on the homing decisions. 
5.2. Stage 1, homing decisions 
If joining a mobile network, a consumer of type (x, y) receives expected 
utility: 
( )ygVi +− σ8
1
 
Where σ8
1
 is the expected disutility from not consuming the most preferred 
mobile variety. The utility if joining the fixed network is given by ( )aV f . 
The size of the mobile segment is accordingly determined by finding the 
taste parameter y* so that subscribers are indifferent as to singlehoming in 
fixed or singlehoming in mobile: 
( ) ( ) σσ 81081 ** +−=⇔=−+− iffi VVygVygV  
It is the consumers with high willingness to pay for mobility that join the 
mobile segment. Thus the size of the mobile sector is *1 ym −= . The 
function g() is everywhere increasing, thus we can write the number of 
customers, at stage 2 of the game, choosing to join the mobile segment, as a 
function of the difference in offered net utilities:  
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 ( ) ( ) 0,1 811 >′+−−=−= − mVVgVVmm iffi σ   
Recall that the net utility from joining the fixed network is a non increasing 
function of the termination fee, i.e. ( ) 00 ≤′ aV . The size of the mobile 
segment is accordingly given by the solution of the following system of 
equations:  
i. ( ) 0, >′−= mVVmm fi  
ii. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )aqmpmqcapV fi −+−++−= 121 210ωσ  
iii. ( ) ( )( )mcacamcp fi −−+−+= 10021  
Proposition 4 
Under singlehoming the termination rate is not profit neutral. Profit in the 
mobile sector is a function of the size of the mobile sector. The size of the 
mobile sector is a function of the termination rate. Furthermore: 
a) The profit of the mobile firms is increasing in the termination rate in 
the point where the termination rate is cost based.  
b) If mobile firms are free to raise the termination rate, the fixed 
network may be driven out of the market or there may exist an 
interior solution.  
The proof is in the appendix. 
In this scenario, the mobile firms have incentives to raise the termination rate 
above the welfare maximizing level, the reason being that the profits in the 
mobile sector are proportional to the size of the mobile sector. Since 
termination revenues are passed on to mobile consumers, the utility of 
mobile subscribers increases in the termination rate. Thus an increase in the 
termination rate will result in a larger mobile sector. If the mobile firms are 
free to set the termination rate they may drive the fixed network out of the 
market or they may end up in an interior solution.  
The fixed network is not necessarily driven out of the market. This result 
deserves a comment. Starting from cost based termination rates there is a 
first order effect when increasing the termination rate resulting in increased 
termination revenues. At stage 3 of the game, these revenues are passed on 
to consumers. Thus the size of the mobile sector increases and so do the 
profits of the mobile firms. As the termination rate increases further there is 
however some effects that come into play and some of these effects 
constrain the mobile firm’s ability to increase the difference in offered 
utility: 
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• The usage price increase which result in a deadweight loss,  
• There is a positive price effect and a negative volume effect; the 
revenues on a given volume of F2M traffic increase, but the volume 
decreases 
• As the termination rate increases, the number of mobile customers 
sharing the (possibly) decreasing termination revenues increases 
Note that, on the one hand, if there is a strong positive link between the 
termination rate on the mobile network and the regulated downstream prices 
charged by the fixed network, then it is more likely that the mobile firms are 
able to drive the fixed network out of the market. On the other hand, even if 
downstream prices in the fixed sector are unaffected by the mobile 
termination rate, the mobile firms will gain from increasing the termination 
rate above the cost based level.  
Dessein (2003) considers a case with heterogeneous consumers, non linear 
pricing and elastic subscription. Similarly to the results presented here, 
Dessein finds that the termination rate is not profit neutral. In his model 
mobile firms prefer a termination rate below costs. This result is in contrast 
to the result above that the mobile firms prefer a high termination rate. The 
difference is due to network effects. Consumers joining the mobile networks 
in Dessein’s model are genuinely new network members. Thus, increasing 
the number of subscribers in one of the competing mobile networks results 
in increased utility for all consumers in both networks. This is in contrast to 
the result from our model of fixed mobile substitution. In our model, an 
expansion of the mobile sector results in a reduction of the fixed sector. Thus 
the number of communication partners is constant.  
According to proposition 4 above, mobile firms prefer a termination rate 
above marginal costs. Furthermore, proposition 4 seems to indicate that the 
mobile firms may set a relatively high termination rate such that the fixed 
network is driven out of the market. Such a high termination rate may 
however violate conditions for a shared market equilibrium in the mobile 
sector. In Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a) appendix B it is demonstrated that 
if the termination margins are large and/or there is high substitutability 
between the networks no equilibrium exists. This result is derived in a model 
with the same structure as our stage 3 game. If termination rates at stage 1 of 
the game are determined at such a high level that stage 3 equilibrium breaks 
down, then our modelling is no longer valid since stage 3 results are derived 
by assuming the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. It is outside the scope 
of the current paper to analyze such a game.  
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6. Conclusions 
The implication of the analysis in the current paper is that there is a case for 
regulating mobile termination rates in the growth phases of mobile 
telephony, whereas there is less need for regulation in mature markets 
characterized by a stable size of the mobile sector. This seems to be the 
opposite of the approach taken by regulators in Europe, where mobile firms 
were free to set termination rates in the growth phase and where regulation is 
introduced once markets mature. 
These results have been derived by considering fixed mobile substitution in a 
model of mobile network competition. We have demonstrated that the 
termination rates are profit neutral if the size of the mobile sector is given. 
An implication of this result is that the mobile termination rate does not have 
an impact on profits in the mobile sector if all subscribers multihome. 
Furthermore, the termination rate is also profit neutral if there is fixed 
mobile substitution of a type where consumers change status from 
multihoming in fixed and mobile to a status where they singlehome in 
mobile. In situations where consumers multihome and there is a positive 
termination margin, mobile firms will set usage prices above perceived 
marginal cost.  
Furthermore, if fixed mobile substitution results in an increased number of 
mobile subscribers, then the mobile termination rate will have an impact on 
profits in the mobile sector. The mechanism behind this result is that profits 
in the mobile sector are proportional to the size of the mobile sector. The 
size of the mobile sector is an increasing function of the net utility offered to 
mobile subscribers. This net utility is increasing in the termination rate 
because termination revenues are being passed on to consumers due to 
competition in the mobile sector. Thus the mobile termination rate will have 
an impact on profitability in the mobile sector if the size of the mobile sector 
is affected.  
In a mixed market situation where the size of the mobile sector is not given 
and there are some subscribers multihoming, the two effects described above 
will in combination result in two kinds of market distortions. At stage 1 of 
the game mobile firms will set termination rates above cost in order to 
induce more subscribers to join the mobile networks, then at stage 3, due to 
the termination margin and the existence of multihoming subscribers, mobile 
firms will have an incentive to raise usage prices above perceived marginal 
cost in order to make multihomers substitute traffic originated in mobile for 
traffic originated in fixed because it results in increased termination 
revenues. 
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Appendix A, Proof of proposition 4 
We have the following system of equations: 
i) 
( ) ( ) 0,1 811 >′+−−=−= − mVVgVVmm iffi σ  
ii) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )aqmpmqcapV fi −+−++−= 121 210ωσ  
iii) 
( ) ( )( )mcacamcp fi −−+−+= 10021  
Total differentiation yields: 
⎟⎟⎠
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V
da
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Combining these expressions yields: 
(A1)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]aqacapqmcapqcam a
V
a
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ffif
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a) 
Consider first the point of cost based termination rates, 0ca = , then the 
expression simplifies to: 
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This proves part a) of the proposition. Note that 0ca f <  is a sufficient, but 
not necessary condition.  
b) 
Consider next the denominator in the expression (A1): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]aqacapqmcapqcam ffif −−+′−−−−′+ 02121001  
When the termination margin is positive we have ( ) 0021 cca >+ , 
furthermore, by assumption, 0ca f < , thus ( )( ) 0021 >−+ faca , the 
denominator is accordingly positive for positive termination margins. The 
sign of (A1) is accordingly determined by the numerator: 
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The right hand side of this expression is always positive, but the inequality 
may not hold for sufficiently high termination margins, thus there may exist 
an interior optimum where the mobile sector has its maximum size, and that 
this size is below 1. 
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Appendix B 
B.1. An emerging market; all in fixed, some multihome F&M 
In this section we let m denote the size of the segment multihoming in fixed 
and mobile, and we let α denote the market share of mobile firm 1 within the 
multihoming segment.  
B.1.1. Stage 3 
Retail profit of firm 1 is now: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ]mcamcacppqTm fR −−−−−−−+= 11ˆˆˆˆ 00111 ααπ  
Profits in the wholesale market consist of three elements: 
1. Calls from multihomers in mobile network 2 terminated in network 
1: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )20220 ˆˆˆ1 pqpqmca +−− αα  
2. Calls from multihomers in mobile network 1 originated in the fixed 
network terminating in mobile network 1: ( ) ( )1220 pˆqmca fα−  
3. Calls from singlehomers in fixed:  ( ) ( ) ( )aqmmca ~10 α−−  
Collecting terms and substituting for net utility yields the following profit 
function: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]aqmpqmpqpqmcam
mcamcacppqVpm
ff
f
~1ˆˆˆˆ1
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Then we can maximize profits: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
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This pricing rule is similar to the one we derived under full multihoming. 
Consider next the condition for optimal net utility where we insert the 
optimal pricing rule: 
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Inserting equilibrium prices and market shares: 
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1ˆ
2
1
001 mqqmmqcaV  
Finally, inserting all equilibrium values back into the profit function: 
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Profits in the mobile sector are accordingly proportional to the size of the 
mobile sector. Then we are back at the same structure as the one we 
considered in section 5 of the paper.  
B.1.2. Stage 1 
At stage 1 of the game consumers choose between becoming singlehomers 
in fixed or multihomers in fixed and mobile. By similar reasoning as in 
section 5, the size of the multihoming segment is given by ( ) 0,ˆˆ >′−= mVVmm fi .  
Similarly to the case of singlehoming, the size of the mobile sector is then 
given by the solution of the following system of equations: 
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(i) ( ) 0,ˆˆ >′−= mVVmm fi  
(ii) 
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(iii) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) αδα mcamcamcacp fi 000 11 −+−−+−−+=  
Proposition 5 
In a market characterized by all consumers being in the fixed network and 
some consumers multihoming in fixed and mobile: 
• The profit neutrality result does not hold.  
• The profit of the mobile firms is increasing in the point of cost based 
termination rates. 
Proof 
The solutions are given as the solution of the following system of equations 
(where we have inserted optimal usage price):  
(i) ( ) 0,ˆ >′−= mVVmm fi   
(ii) 
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Total differentiation of this system yields: 
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Consider now, as a reference point, cost based termination rates, i.e. 0ca = , 
then the second equation simplifies to: 
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and we can combine the two expressions to obtain: 
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his is similar to the expression under singlehoming.  
QED 
The result is similar to what we found under singlehoming. Thus, if mobile 
firms are free to set termination rates they can increase profits by increasing 
the termination rate above costs. Furthermore, if the resulting termination 
rate is sufficiently high, stage 3 equilibrium will break down.  
B.2. A mature market, All in mobile, some multihome FM  
In this section we assume that consumers, at stage 3 of the game, are divided 
into two groups, a segment of singlehomers in mobile and a segment of 
multihomers. The size of the singlehoming segment is sm  and the 
multihoming segment is sm−1 . Firm i offers tariffs targeted at the single- 
and multihoming segments respectively: ( ) ( ){ }iiii pTpT ˆ,ˆ,, , thus market 
shares of firm 1 within the two segments become:  
 ( ) ( )( )iiiis TTpp +−−+= ωωσα 2
1
 
 ( ) ( )( )2121 ˆˆ,ˆˆ,ˆˆ21 TTapapm +−−+= ωωσα  
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We assume that firms are able (and allowed) to condition the offered mobile 
tariff on whether the subscribers are within the single- or multihoming 
segment, thus they can do third degree price discrimination.14  
Retail profit is now: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]011 011 1ˆ,ˆˆˆ1
1
cacpapqTm
cacppqTm
ms
ssR
−−−−−−+
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Recall that net utility is given by ( ) iii TpV −=ω , and ( ) iii TapV ˆ,ˆˆ −=ω , 
substituting V for T yields: 
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Wholesale profits consist of four elements, incoming traffic from the other 
mobile network originated by single- and multihomers respectively, and 
incoming traffic originated in the fixed network by customers multihoming 
in the two mobile networks: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]apqapqapqcam
pqcam
mmms
ssw
,1,ˆ,ˆ11
1
201020
20
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In order to simplify calculations we carry out profit maximization in two 
steps by first maximizing profits, WR ππ + , subject to the constraint that ( ) msss mm ααα −+= 1 , and then finding optimal total market share.15 
Thus we maximize the Lagrangian (where λ is the Lagrange multiplier): 
 ( )( )msssWR mmL αααλππ −+−++= 1  
And then we maximize the Lagrangian with respect to total market share α 
by applying the envelope theorem.  
 
Proposition 6 
In a market characterized by all consumers being in one of the mobile 
networks and some consumers multihoming in fixed and mobile: 
                                                     
14 Note that the homing decisions made at stage 1 of the game typically is 
observable.  
15 This approach is due to Hahn, J. H., 2004. 
 32
• The profit neutrality result holds 
• The usage price charged from singlehoming consumers is at 
perceived marginal cost 
• The usage price charged from multihoming consumers is adjusted 
upwards (for positive termination margins) 
• The fixed fee charge from singlehoming consumers exceeds the 
fixed fee charged from multihoming subscribers  
Proof 
Profits, WR ππ + , are to be maximized subject to the constraint that ( ) msss mm ααα −+= 1 , thus we have the following Lagrangian: 
(where λ is the Lagrange multiplier): 
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Consider: 
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and: 
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Simplification: as in earlier sections, assume constant 
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Then we can write: ( )( ) ( )δαα 001 1ˆ cacacp −+−−+=  
Consider next: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )
0
1
20
01111
1
=
−−−
−−−−+−+−=∂
∂
σλασ
αωσα
ss
sss
mpqmca
cacppqVpmm
V
L
 
Inserting optimal usage price and solving with respect to V1: 
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Then consider: 
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Inserting optimal usage price and solving with respect to 1ˆV : 
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Consider then optimal target network size: 
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We can now characterize equilibrium by combining optimal pricing, optimal 
net utilities, and optimal market shares, i.e. 
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2
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2121 ,ˆˆˆ, ======= mspppppp ααα . Then the condition for 
optimal market share simplifies to ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]00 1ˆ1 qmqmqmca sss −+−+−−=λ , 
and we obtain: 
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and: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )02100211
201020
0111
1ˆˆˆ
2
1ˆ
,ˆ,ˆ,ˆˆ
,ˆˆ,ˆˆˆ
qmqmqmcacaqV
apqapqapqca
caapqapV
sss
m
−+−+−+−++−=
−−+−−+
−++−=
δωσ
λα
δαωσ
α
 
Finally, equilibrium values can be inserted into the profit function: 
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Then inserting net utilities: 
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Thus profit neutrality holds.  
 36
Consider next equilibrium fixed fees: 
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and note that: 
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The sign indicated above holds if singlehomers in mobile originate more 
calls in the mobile network as compared to multihomers. 
QED 
The results above are derived by assuming third degree price discrimination, 
but the profit neutrality result is likely to hold under second degree price 
discrimination as well. Seen from a mobile network, singlehoming and 
multihoming consumers can be seen as high volume and low volume 
customers respectively. As demonstrated by Dessein 2003 (two type model) 
and Hahn 2004 (continuum of types) the profit neutrality holds in models 
with consumer heterogeneity, as long as the total number of mobile 
subscribers is given.  
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Abstract: 
In this paper we study network competition when costs differ among 
interconnected networks. Such cost differences are observed in the mobile 
sector as well as in fixed networks. In the paper we find that cost based 
regulation will not result in first best market shares. The low cost firm will 
be too small in equilibrium. This is partly due to tariff mediated network 
externalities. This result is in contrast to the standard result in the literature 
on network competition where one assumes symmetric cost structure. In the 
present paper, the regulator can induce a first best market equilibrium by 
combining cost based regulation of termination rates with a tax based on the 
number of subscribers. If such a tax is not an available instrument, the 
regulator can improve welfare by granting a termination margin to the low 
cost firm as compared to cost based regulation.  
 
Keywords: Network competition, cost asymmetries, telecommunications 
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1. Introduction 
The telecommunication industry is deregulated in most countries and is 
becoming increasingly more competitive. Nevertheless it is expected that 
some services will still require regulatory scrutiny. Wholesale termination of 
calls is an example of a market where networks, even in competitive 
environments, is in a de facto monopoly position since they are exclusive 
providers of termination services to their own customer base. Accordingly 
regulators have implemented, or are considering implementing price 
regulation of termination rates. Starting with the papers by Laffont Rey and 
Tirole (1998a,b) and Armstrong (1998) there is a considerable body of 
papers analysing network competition under various assumptions. These 
papers provide guidance for regulators when determining termination rates. 
The implication of cost heterogeneity is however hardly addressed in the 
literature.  
 
In the present paper we introduce cost heterogeneity in the, by now standard 
model of network competition. It is demonstrated that an optimal policy is 
not characterised by termination rates regulated at marginal costs because 
the low cost firm becomes too small in equilibrium. This is partly due to the 
assumed type of competition and partly due to tariff mediated externalities. 
Consumers choosing to subscribe to the high cost network do not take into 
account that by doing so the price other consumers have to pay to call them 
becomes high. By choosing to change subscription from the high cost to the 
low cost network, the cost of calling that particular subscriber would 
decrease for all other subscribers. When choosing network, subscribers do 
not take into account this tariff mediated externality. An optimal regulatory 
scheme can be implemented by introducing instruments in addition to 
regulated termination rates. By taxing inefficient firms and/or subsidising 
efficient firms based on the number of subscribers one obtains optimal 
market shares. To our knowledge such taxation and subsidisation are not 
available instruments to regulators. If regulators are restricted to using 
regulation of termination rates as the only regulatory instruments we 
demonstrate that the equilibrium market share of the efficient firm increases 
if this firm is granted a (small) margin on termination. The welfare gain from 
increased market share of the efficient firm will however have to be 
balanced against the deadweight loss due to increasing prices above 
marginal costs. In the paper we demonstrate that the positive market share 
effect dominates for small termination margins, thus it is welfare improving 
to grant a small termination margin to the most efficient firm. In special 
cases it may be optimal to set a reciprocal termination fee equal to the 
marginal cost of the high cost firm. 
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There is reason to believe that marginal cost of terminating calls will differ 
among some types of networks. In the current paper we have two particular 
cases in mind. The first case is a situation where a traditional fixed telephony 
network is competing with an IP based telephony network. The other case 
we have in mind is when two competing mobile networks based on different 
radio spectrum allocations compete.1 
 
IP telephony comes in many varieties, some with characteristics very similar 
to traditional telephony, seen from the consumer side. By connecting an 
adapter to any broadband link with a standard interface (Ethernet), the 
customer can connect any traditional telephone terminal to the adapter. The 
customer will hear a dial tone, can use traditional phone numbers and reach 
any other phone (examples of providers of such services are Vonage in the 
US and Telio in Norway). The cost structure of IP based telephony is 
different from the cost structure of running a traditional telephony network. 
This is mainly due to economies of scope. A traditional telephony network is 
dedicated for one single service, whereas an IP network is multipurpose. The 
infrastructure cost is accordingly shared among several services. The cost of 
providing IP telephony to a customer that also consumes other services 
based on IP is accordingly low compared to the cost of providing traditional 
telephony. One might argue that since the cost of IP telephony is lower than 
the cost of providing traditional telephony, IP will rapidly replace traditional 
telephony. If so, the question of analysing interconnection of networks with 
different cost structures is only of interest in a transitory phase. The cost 
advantage is however based on economies of scope between a set of 
communication services. It is likely that a significant proportion of the 
customers will only buy one single communication service; telephony. Thus 
it is likely that both traditional telephony and IP based telephony will have 
positive market shares and accordingly exist side by side over a period.  
 
Mobile telephony is based on usage of the radio spectrum. The radio 
spectrum is a scarce resource, and competing mobile networks are typically 
based on different spectrum allocations resulting in different cost structures. 
In a European context, mobile networks are based on 900 MHz licenses, on 
1800 MHz licences, and/or UMTS licences (a number of frequency blocks in 
the range 1900 to 2200 MHz). It is likely that this variation results in cost 
                                                     
1 Another evident example of networks with different cost structure is when fixed 
and mobile networks interconnect. In the current paper the focus is on competing 
networks where consumers choose to connect to one, and only one of the networks. 
This is not necessarily the case for fixed/mobile. A large proportion of the mobile 
customer base is also subscribers to the fixed network (so-called multihoming).  
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differences since the geographical area that can be covered by a single radio 
cell is a function of frequency.  
 
There is some empirical evidence supporting the assertion that there are 
differences in marginal costs between telephony networks. Correa (2003) 
estimates a cost function for fixed line telephony providers in the UK and 
finds significant differences in marginal costs of providing local calls 
between firms based on traditional fixed line technology as compared to 
firms based on cable TV technology.2 The Competition Commission in the 
UK, based on an engineering model, estimated the difference in long run 
incremental network cost of termination mobile calls between combined 
900/1800 operators and 1800 operators to be in the range 12% -18% (see 
Competition Commission 2003, table 2.8). Another example is the cost 
calculations done by the Swedish regulator PTS where they also discovered 
cost differences (see PTS 2004). They did not however publish the exact cost 
differences.3  
 
Regulators determine termination rates in many countries. As indicated 
above the literature does not provide much guidance as to how one should 
deal with heterogeneous costs. Interestingly, the regulators in both Sweden 
and in the UK identified cost differences in the mobile sector, but they have 
chosen quite different approaches. In the UK, estimated cost differences are 
exactly reflected in the regulated termination rates, i.e. the termination rates 
differ among the networks. In Sweden the regulator chose to set the same 
termination fee for all the three regulated mobile networks and it was set at 
the highest estimated level.  
 
The literature on network competition was initiated by Laffont Rey and 
Tirole (1998a,b) and Armstrong (1998). Introductions to this literature can 
be found in Laffont and Tirole (2000) as well as in Armstrong (2002), and an 
overview of some recent contributions is provided in Peitz et al. (2004). In 
most of these works it is assumed identical cost structure and reciprocal 
                                                     
2 On the one hand, the number of TV subscribers connected to the network has a 
significant positive effect on the marginal cost of providing local calls in her study. 
On the other hand, the number of TV subscribers has a significant negative effect on 
the cost of providing telephony subscriptions. The implication is that cable TV 
networks, as compared to traditional telephony networks, can provide telephony 
subscriptions at lower marginal costs, whereas the marginal costs of providing calls 
are higher. 
3 It is not a trivial task to measure incremental cost, and it is likely that some fixed 
and/or common costs are included in the LRIC results referred above. Fixed and 
common costs are typically not relevant in pricing decisions. Due to the technical 
reasons listed above it is nevertheless likely that marginal costs also differ between 
networks. 
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termination fees. Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a) demonstrate 
that under uniform pricing, a reciprocal termination fee above costs will 
serve as a collusive device. Under nonlinear pricing, this result changes. 
Laffont et al. (1998b) demonstrate that the two networks are indifferent with 
respect to the termination fee under two part tariffs, whereas Gans and King 
(2001) find that a reciprocal termination fee below cost will serve as a 
collusive device when networks are allowed to price discriminate between 
on- and off-net traffic.  
 
The literature accordingly indicates that reciprocal termination fees may 
serve as a collusive device in some cases. Furthermore, if the termination fee 
is determined unilaterally each network has an incentive to raise its 
termination fee well above marginal cost4 resulting in a welfare loss (Gans 
and King 2001). 
 
Regulators have recognised these results and thus they are attempting to 
regulate termination rates. When networks are symmetric, the advice to 
regulators from the literature is straightforward; it is optimal to set a 
reciprocal termination fee equal to marginal cost. The picture is however not 
as straightforward if networks are asymmetric. Two classes of asymmetries 
have been studied in the literature:5 1) Vertical differentiation between the 
networks, and 2) asymmetric cost structures.  
 
Vertically differentiated networks are studied in Carter and Wright (2003) 
where the source of the quality differential is motivated by the asymmetry 
between an entrant and an incumbent. They consider two part tariffs and 
reciprocal termination fees. The superior network (the incumbent) will then 
always prefer a termination fee at marginal cost whereas the newcomer may 
want a termination fee above costs. The termination fee preferred by the high 
quality network is also the welfare maximising termination fee. Peitz (2005) 
considers a model fairly identical to the model considered by Carter and 
Wright, Peitz however focuses on incentives for newcomers to entry.6 
Granting a termination mark-up to the entrant makes consumers better off, 
but the total welfare is reduced. Since the profits of the newcomer also 
                                                     
4 Given that the consumer’s willingness to pay does not increase with the number of 
incoming calls, the profit maximising termination fee is the monopoly price. 
Introducing willingness to pay for receiving calls will result in a downward 
correction to this price. 
5 There is another strand of literature considering consumer heterogeneity and 
unbalanced calling patterns, demonstrating that reciprocal termination fees under 
two part tariffs is still profit neutral, see e.g. Dessein, (2003). 
6 In De Bijl and Peitz, 2002, the dynamics of asymmetric competition and entry is 
considered in a number of numerical simulations. 
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increase, Peitz argues that entry is being stimulated. Peitz (2002) 
demonstrates that most of these results are also valid under price 
discrimination between on- and off-net traffic. 
 
Armstrong (2004) introduces asymmetric costs and heterogeneous calling 
patterns into a model of network competition. In this model it is the low cost 
network that should be granted a termination mark-up in order to stimulate 
the low cost network to sign up the welfare maximising number of 
subscribers. The modelling in this paper is however different from the 
modelling framework in the other papers cited above. In particular, 
Armstrong analyses a case where demand is inelastic and where a dominant 
firm is being regulated in the downstream market, and a number of small 
firms are price takers (a competitive fringe). By assuming inelastic demand, 
modelling is simplified, but by assuming that usage is independent of 
marginal prices, there is no welfare loss from granting termination mark-ups 
for given market shares. Furthermore, since the dominant firm is regulated in 
the downstream market, there is limited strategic interaction between the 
firms.  
 
The contribution of the current paper is to take a cost asymmetry similar to 
the one considered by Armstrong into the standard Laffont Rey Tirole model 
where firms offer three part tariffs and compete à la Hotelling in the 
downstream market. Based on this model we are in a position to investigate 
welfare properties of some policies with respect to the regulation of 
termination fees.  
 
The three major results in the current paper are: 1) cost based regulation will 
not result in first best market shares. The most efficient firm will be too 
small. 2) Taxation and subsidisation based on the number of subscribers can 
induce the first outcome. 3) As compared to cost based regulation of 
termination rates, granting a (small) termination mark up to the most 
efficient firm results in increased welfare.  
 
The first results are in line with the results derived in Armstrong 2004. The 
model studied by Armstrong does however not allow distinguishing result 2 
from result 3. In the Armstrong model a margin on termination services has 
the same effect as a subsidy based on the number of subscribers since 
demand is inelastic. In the current paper we demonstrate that the deadweight 
loss from regulating a price away from the underlying marginal cost is 
dominated by a positive market share effect for small termination margins. A 
regulator can accordingly increase welfare by granting (small) margins to 
low cost firms. This result lends support to the regulatory approach taken in 
Sweden where the regulation of termination rates in effect results in margins 
to the efficient firms.  
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The paper is organised as follows: In section 2 the model is presented, in 
section 3 the welfare properties of cost based regulations are considered. In 
section 4 optimal regulation is derived. In section 5 the effects of granting 
termination margins to the efficient firm are investigated and finally, in 
section 6 we conclude. 
2. The model 
We consider a two-stage game; in the first stage the regulator determines the 
interconnection fees and in the second stage the two networks compete à la 
Hotelling. The market is covered, i.e. all consumers are signed up to one of 
the two networks. Thus prices are not affecting market size, but prices affect 
market shares and usage. For notational simplicity total market size is 
normalised to 1. It is important to have in mind that results from models on 
network competition depend on the contracts offered to consumers. There 
are four different types of contracts typically being discussed in the 
literature: uniform pricing, price discrimination, two part tariffs and two part 
tariffs with price discrimination.7 In the current paper we consider the most 
general contract; two part tariffs with price discrimination. Network i (i = 1, 
2) offers contracts: { }iii ppF ˆ,,  where Fi is the fixed fee (subscription fee), 
pi is the per minute price of calling other subscribers of the same network 
(on – net price), and ipˆ  is the price of calling subscribers of the other 
network (off – net price).  
2.1. Demand and market shares 
Let y denote the sum of the value of income and the stand alone value of 
network subscription.8 Consumer tastes are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed over a line of length 1. Given quantity of calls made q, a 
consumer located at x joining network i has utility: 
 ( )quxxty i +−− . 
The parameter t is a measure of disutility from not consuming the most 
preferred brand (travelling cost). Our assumption of a fully covered market 
is fulfilled given that the utility from making calls on the network is 
sufficiently high. Define: 
                                                     
7 In LRT 98a and LRT 98b the basic model is derived in all these four cases. 
8 For notational simplicity the two terms income and value of network subscription 
are added together since the market is covered and all consumers are connected to a 
network.  
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 ( ) ( ) pqqupv
q
−≡ max . 
Let αi denote the market share of network i. The net value of being a 
subscriber of network i can then be written: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiiii FpvpvV −−+= ˆ1 αα . 
Throughout the paper we will focus on shared market equilibriums. Such 
equilibriums exist as long as the disutility parameter t is sufficiently large 
and the difference in utility (Vi – Vj) is not too large. We will later return to 
the exact parameter restrictions under the different cases considered below. 
Given the existence of a shared equilibrium, market shares will be 
determined by the location of the consumer being indifferent between the 
two networks: 
 ( ) ( )jiiijii VVttVtV −+=⇔−−=− 21211 ααα  
By defining t21=σ , substituting for Vi and Vj and rearranging, market 
shares can be written: 
(1.) 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]jiji
jiji
i pvpvpvpv
FFpvpv
ˆˆ1
ˆ
2
1
−−+−
+−−+
= σ
σ
α  
2.2. Cost structure 
There is a fixed cost for connecting customers f. Furthermore the marginal 
costs of on-net traffic for network i is assumed to be ic . This cost can be 
decomposed into two parts, origination and termination, each assumed to be 
50% of the total cost. The cost is assumed to differ between the two 
networks. Network i is assumed to charge ai for termination services. In 
order to simplify notation we define true and perceived marginal cost for off-
net traffic: 
 
( )
jii
ji
acc
ccc
+=
+=
2
1ˆ
2
1
 
2.3. Benchmark, welfare-maximising solution 
As a reference point we start by deriving the welfare maximising solution, 
i.e. maximising the welfare function given by: 
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( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )cqqucqqu
cqqucqqu
fyW
iii
iii
ii
22222
11111
2
ˆˆ)(1
ˆˆ1
122
4
1
−+−−1−+
−−+−+
+−−−=
ααα
ααα
αασ
 
Recall that the total number of subscribers is normalised to one. The 
interpretation of the welfare function is then straightforward. For market 
shares αi (and 1 - αi) the third term is average disutility from not consuming 
the most preferred variety, whereas the last to terms give the difference 
between generated utility and costs for a given number of calls. This 
function is to be maximised with respect to iqqqq α,ˆ,,ˆ, 2211 . It is 
straightforward to see from the expression above, that as long as the function 
u() is increasing and concave, optimal usage is given by: 
 
( ){ }
( ){ }cucqq
cucqq
i
i
qii
iqiii
=′=
=′=
ˆˆ *
*
 
Define ( ) ( ) **** ˆˆ, iiiiii qcquvqcquv −=−= , then the welfare function 
can be written: 
(2.)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )vvvfyW iijiiiiii αααααασα −+−+++−−−= 12112241 222*  
Differentiating with respect to market share yields: 
 ( ) vvvvvW ijijiii
i
αααασα 42222122
1 −++−+−−=∂
∂
 
An interior solution satisfies: 
(3.) 
( )
( )vvv
vvW
ji
j
i 221
2
2
1
0 * −+−
−−
=⇔=∂
∂
σ
σ
αα  
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This is an interior solution to the maximisation problem iff vvi 222
1 −>σ , 
when network i is the low cost network. We will throughout the paper 
assume that this condition is fulfilled.9  
2.4. Market equilibrium 
The firms will maximise their profits by determining an optimal contract { }iii ppF ˆ,, . The profits of each firm can be written:  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )jiiji
iiiji
iiii
iii
pqca
pqcp
pqcp
fF
ˆ
ˆˆˆ
2
1
2
−+
−+
−+
−=
αα
αα
α
απ
 
 
The first line is the profits on subscription, the second line is profits from on-
net traffic, the third is profits on off-net traffic, and the last line is the profits 
in the wholesale market. As demonstrated in LRT 98a it is convenient to 
consider profit maximisation as if firms offer a net surplus ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiiii FpvpvV −−+= ˆ1 αα , and some usage prices10, thus the firms 
solve:  
 
( ) ( )( )[
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )]jiiji
iiiji
iiii
iijiiippV
pqca
pqcp
pqcp
fVpvpv
iii
ˆ
ˆˆˆ
ˆmax
2
1
2
ˆ,,
−+
−+
−+
−−+
αα
αα
α
ααα
 
Note that, for given net surplus V, market shares are independent of usage 
prices. Recall that )()( ii pqpv −=′  and consider the first order conditions 
for optimal on- and off-net prices: 
                                                     
9 The condition for existence and stability is that the networks are sufficiently 
differentiated, i.e. σ small, and that the differences in costs are not too large and that 
the termination margins are not too large. One of the firms will corner the market if 
either of these conditions are violated. This condition is discussed in appendix A. 
10 Note however that games where net utilities are the strategic variables yield 
equilibria different from the equilibria one obtains when firms use prices as strategic 
variables. The result with respect to usage prices is however identical in the two 
types of games.  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) iiiiiiijii
iiiiiiiii
cppqcppqpvp
cppqcppqpvp
ˆˆ0ˆˆˆˆˆˆ
0:
:
2
=⇔=−++′
=⇔=−++′
αα
α
 
This is a well-known result (see LRT 1998a). The firms determine usage 
prices by maximising the sum of producer and consumer surplus, and then 
they will extract as much consumer surplus as possible via the fixed fee. 
Since on-net traffic is always priced at marginal cost, we can save notation 
by defining: ( )ii cvv ≡ . Let mi be the margin on termination services defined 
by: iii cam 21−≡ . Then we can write: ji mcc +=ˆ  since: 
jjjijii mcmccacc +=++=+= 212121ˆ . 
 
Consider now the optimal fixed fees:  
(4.) ( ) ( )[ ]iijiiiF mcqmfFi ++− αααmax  
Inserting for ij αα −=1  and differentiating yields the following set of first 
order conditions: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )iii
i
i
i
i
i
i mcqmF
fF
F
+−∂
∂+−∂
∂+= αααα 210  
Inserting for market shares, and rearranging yields: 
(5.)
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )( )iijiji jiiiji
j
iijiji
ii
i
mcqmvvvv
vvfmcqmvvf
F
mcqmvvvv
mcqmF
++−−+−
+−++−−+++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++−−+−
++=
σσ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
ˆˆ14
ˆ21
2
ˆ
4
1
2
ˆˆ122
1
 
For given termination margins, mi, the system of first order conditions (5.) is 
a system of linear equations. Equilibrium will typically exist and be stable 
for sufficiently differentiated networks with not too large cost asymmetries 
and not too large termination margins. For each of the special cases 
considered below we will provide conditions for the existence of a shared 
market equilibrium as well as conditions for stability.11  
                                                     
11 The best response function above is a generalised version of the response 
functions in e.g. Gans and King (2001), and Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998b). They 
provide conditions for existence under cost symmetry. 
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3. Cost based termination fees 
As indicated above the literature suggests that regulating termination 
services to marginal costs yields a socially optimal outcome.12 In this section 
of the paper we will investigate whether this result is valid when costs differ 
among the two networks.  
When termination fees are regulated down to marginal cost, i.e. 0=im , the 
best response functions in (5.) simplifies to: 
 
24
1
22
jj
i
vvfFF
−+++= σ  
where ( )cvv ≡ . The slope of the best response functions is the same for the 
two firms, whereas the intercepts differ. Let firm i be the low cost firm. We 
impose the following parameter restriction13 in order to obtain an interior 
solution: ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+> vvv ji 3
1
3
2
2
1
σ . The equilibrium is illustrated below: 
 
Fj
Fi
45º
( ) ( )
24
1
2
jcvcvf −++ σ
( ) ( )
24
1
2
icvcvf −++ σ
σ4
1
2
+f
 
Figure 1, Equilibrium under cost based regulation 
                                                     
12 Even in the Peitz (2005) model, total welfare is reduced when one network (the 
entrant) is granted a termination mark-up. Peitz however argues that there may be a 
dynamic gain from allowing termination margins for newcomers because entry is 
stimulated. 
13 The condition is discussed in appendix B.  
 13
From figure 1 we can see directly that the most efficient firm is charging a 
fixed fee that is higher than the less efficient firm. By combining the two 
best response functions we can calculate equilibrium fixed fees: 
 ( )vvvfF jii 323121 −+−+= σ  
PROPOSITION 1. Under cost based regulation, the market share of the 
most efficient firm is too small compared to the welfare maximising market 
share. 
 
PROOF: Let firm i be the low cost firm. The equilibrium difference in fixed 
fees is: 
 ( ) 0
3
1 >−=− jiji vvFF .  
Consider now the difference in fixed fees that would have induced welfare 
maximising market shares, *F∆ . Combining the condition for first best 
market shares (3.), with the expression for market shares as a function of 
fixed fees (1.), yields:  
 
( )
( )
[ ]
[ ]
( )( ) 02212
21
2
1
221
2
2
1
*
*
<−+−
−=∆
⇔−+−
∆−−+
=−+−
−−
vvv
vv
F
vvv
Fvv
vvv
vv
ji
ij
ji
j
ji
j
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
 
Thus: ( ) *0 FFF ji ∆>>− . From the market share function (1.) we readily 
see that the market share of the most efficient firm then becomes too small in 
equilibrium. QED. 
 
Equilibrium market shares can be calculated by inserting the difference in 
equilibrium fixed fees, calculated above, into the market share function (1.): 
(6.) ( ) ( )( )( )vvv vvvvvv
vv
vv
ji
ji
ji
ji
j
i 216
2323
21
32
1
−+−
−−+=−+−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+
= σ
σ
σ
σ
α  
As demonstrated above, the most efficient firm is too small in equilibrium. 
This result is partly due to externalities. Since prices differ in equilibrium, 
the model exhibits tariff mediated network externalities. Consumers on both 
networks are affected by the network choice made by the indifferent 
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consumer. If one consumer switches from the high cost to the low cost 
network, the price of making calls to this consumer falls, both for customers 
in the high cost and customers in the low cost network. Thus, if a consumer 
switches from the high cost to the low cost network, everybody else is better 
off. The firms do not however have any incentives to let this externality be 
reflected in the fixed fees. The two firms compete for the marginal customer 
taking into consideration the profit contribution from this consumer and 
without having a mechanism to extract (a fraction of) the increased 
willingness to pay from all the customers already on the network.  
 
The result above is however only partly due to network externalities. One 
obtains the same qualitative result in a Hotelling model with differences in 
marginal costs in the absence of network externalities. The low cost firm 
does not have incentives to compete sufficiently aggressively for consumers. 
It becomes too small in equilibrium. The externality effect comes however in 
addition. 
 
The conditions for having two networks as a welfare maximising solution 
(A1) and getting a shared market equilibrium (A2) are respectively: 
(A1) vvi 222
1 −>σ  
(A2) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+> vvv ji 3
1
3
2
2
1
σ  
There exist parameter combinations where the second, but not the first 
condition is satisfied. Thus we may have equilibrium under cost based 
regulation where two firms are active, but where a welfare maximising 
market structure is to only have one network. Following Peitz (2005), one of 
the networks can be considered as a newcomer. The implication of the result 
above is then that cost based regulation may stimulate inefficient entry. This 
case may be relevant in the mobile sector where the licenses to the most cost 
effective frequencies are allocated first, implying that the last entrant to the 
market has cost disadvantages relative to the established firms. In the fixed 
sector we may have the opposite case. Newcomers to the fixed sector are 
typically based on IP technology which is expected to be more cost efficient. 
The results above indicate that we may end up in a situation where it would 
be welfare maximising to switch off the old telephony network, but where 
market equilibrium yields the opposite result.  
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4. Optimal regulation 
In the section above we demonstrated that cost based regulation of 
termination fees on the one hand resulted in optimal usage prices, but on the 
other hand in market shares deviating from the welfare maximising level. If 
termination rates are altered in order to induce optimal market shares, the 
result will be that usage prices deviate from the optimal level. The regulator 
is in a situation where the number of objectives exceeds the number of 
available instruments. The regulator accordingly needs more instruments in 
order to induce a welfare maximising outcome.  
 
One obvious alternative for introducing more regulatory instruments is to 
consider a tax τi per subscriber in order to induce a first best market 
equilibrium. Then profits become: 
 ( )iiii fF ταπ −−=  
and best response functions are:  
 
( ) ( )
24
1
222
jij
i
cvcvfFF
−++++= σ
τ
 
 
PROPOSITION 2. The regulator can induce a welfare maximising market 
equilibrium by setting cost based termination rates and: 
a) Subsidise the efficient firm per subscriber, or 
b) Impose a tax per subscriber on the inefficient firm, or 
c) A combination 
 
PROOF:  
Equilibrium fixed fees are a function of the pair of per subscriber taxes:
 ( )vvvfF jiiji 32312132 −+−+++= σττ  
Optimal taxes must be determined such that they induce welfare maximising 
market shares, thus they must satisfy: 
 ( )( )vvv vvFF ji jiji 2212 −+−
−−= σ  
Inserting for equilibrium fixed fees and solving with respect to the tax 
difference yields: 
 ( ) ( )( ) 02212 31 <⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−+−−=− vvvvv jijiji σττ  
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Under our parameter restrictions (A1), the square bracket is positive. 
Assuming that firm i is the most efficient firm we have 0>− ji vv . Thus a 
pair of taxes implementing first best is characterized by 0<− ji ττ . QED 
 
From the result above we see that it is sufficient to impose a tax on the 
inefficient firm or to introduce a subsidy to the efficient firm. This result 
may seem to oppose the regulatory objectives of providing a “level playing 
field”. Instead efficient technologies should be “favoured”. 
 
5. Effects of granting a termination margin to the 
efficient firm 
There are, to our knowledge, no examples of regulators having introduced 
per subscriber taxes and subsidies of the type discussed above. In this section 
we will consider “second best” regulation, i.e. analyse whether allowing 
termination margins will result in market equilibrium where market shares 
are closer to the optimum level.14  
 
Firm i is still assumed to be the efficient firm. Assume that the regulator 
determines a positive termination margin, m, for the efficient firm and 
applies cost based regulation for the inefficient firm.  
 
In this case usage prices are: 
 
cp
cp
i
ii
=
=
ˆ
     
mcp
cp
j
jj
+=
=
ˆ
 
The best response functions simplify to: 
 
( )( )
( )[ ]( )( )jjji jijj
j
jjji
j
i
qmvvvv
vvfqmvvf
F
qmvvvv
qm
F
ˆˆ14
ˆ21ˆ
24
1
2
ˆˆ12
ˆ
2
1
σσ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
+−−+−
+−+−−+++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−−+−+=
 
and: 
                                                     
14 Note that the regulation of Swedish mobile termination can be seen as a special 
case of such regulation since the regulated reciprocal termination rate is cost based 
for the least efficient firm. Thus the other two firms, being more efficient, are 
granted a termination mark-up. 
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2
ˆ
4
1
22
iji
j
vvfFF
−+++= σ  
By combining the best response functions we obtain equilibrium fixed fees. 
Explicit expressions are provided in appendix A.3. These equilibrium fixed 
fees can be inserted into the market share function (1.). Then we obtain 
market shares as a function of the termination margin: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) jjiji jjiji qmvvvv
qmvvvv
m
ˆ4ˆ16
ˆ2ˆ2223
σσ
σσα +−−+−
+−−+−=  
Under our assumptions there does exist an interior solution for m = 0, i.e. 
under cost based regulation. For sufficiently high termination margins, this 
may change. Differentiation of the market share function with respect to the 
termination margin yields: 
(7.)
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )2ˆ4ˆ16
ˆ2ˆ2223ˆˆ
ˆ
2
2
jjiji
jjijijjji
j
qmvvvv
qmvvvvqvvvv
m
q
m
m σσ
σσσ
σα +−−+−
+−−+−+−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−
=′
 
PROPOSITION 3. The market share of the efficient firm is monotonously 
increasing in the termination margin granted to the efficient firm for any non 
negative termination margin. 
 
PROOF 
A sufficient condition is that the expression in (7.) is strictly positive. The 
denominator is always positive. A non negative termination margin implies 
m ≥ 0. The first bracket in the numerator is then positive (= 0 for m = 0) 
since the demand function has a negative slope. The second bracket is also 
positive because ji vv >  by assumption, and jvv ˆ>  for ji vv >  and m ≥ 0. 
Finally, the third bracket is positive by assumption since it is a necessary 
condition for a shared market equilibrium to exist. QED 
 
The implication of the result above is that the regulator, starting from a cost 
based equilibrium, can bring the market closer to the optimal market shares 
by introducing a termination margin to the efficient firm. However, this gain 
has to be balanced against the deadweight loss resulting from increased 
usage prices due to the termination margin.  
 
PROPOSITION 4. Total welfare is increasing in the termination margin at 
m = 0  
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The proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix A.4.  
 
By granting a (small) termination margin to the efficient firm, the regulator 
can accordingly increase welfare.  
 
Note that the regulatory regime in Sweden, where calculated costs differ and 
where the regulator is imposing a reciprocal termination fee equal to the cost 
of the least efficient network can be seen as a way of approximating the 
second best solution of the type we are discussing. Whether the termination 
margins granted to the more efficient firms in Sweden are too small, exactly 
equal to, or above the welfare maximising level is however not possible to 
evaluate based on the model presented here.  
 
The introduction of a termination margin has two effects on the market 
outcome. A termination margin of the type discussed here results in 
increased vertical differentiation since the price paid for off-net traffic by 
customers of the high cost firm increases. We will denote this effect the 
retail effect. Furthermore, the termination margin has a direct effect on 
profits in the wholesale market since the low cost firm makes profits on 
incoming traffic due to the termination margin. In the following we will 
decompose the effect of introducing a termination margin into the retail 
effect and a wholesale effect.  
 
Assume that the high cost firm has to pay a margin m on outgoing traffic, 
and assume that the low cost firm is exposed to a tax on incoming traffic 
such that the regulator exactly confiscates the revenues from the termination 
margin. Thus the retail effect is present whereas the regulator is cancelling 
out the wholesale effect due to taxation. By analysing equilibrium in this 
case we can highlight the effects due to the retail effect.  
In this case the best response functions simplify to: 
 
2
ˆ
4
1
22
24
1
22
iji
j
jj
i
vvfFF
vvfFF
−+++=
−+++=
σ
σ  
Equilibrium fixed fees become: 
 
3
ˆ22
2
1
3
ˆ22
2
1
jji
j
jji
i
vvvv
fF
vvvv
fF
−−+−+=
−−+−+=
σ
σ  
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Thus the market share of the low cost firm (firm i) becomes: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )jji jjir vvvv
vvvv
m
ˆ16
ˆ2223
−−+−
−−+−= σ
σα  
PROPOSITION 5, As compared to cost based regulation, introducing a 
termination margin results in the following effects on the market share of the 
most efficient firm:  
a) A positive retail effect 
b) A negative wholesale effect.  
 
Proof: 
A sufficient condition for the result above to hold is that the market share of 
the most efficient firm is larger when we only take the retail effect into 
consideration as compared to a situation where we consider both effects, i.e. ( ) ( )mm rαα < : 
 
( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) 0ˆ2ˆ13ˆ13
ˆˆ
ˆ16
ˆ2223
ˆ4ˆ16
ˆ2ˆ2223
2
>+−−+−−−+−
−+−=
−−+−
−−+−−+−−+−
+−−+−=
−
jjjijji
jjij
jji
jji
jjiji
jjiji
r
qmvvvvvvvv
vvvvqm
vvvv
vvvv
qmvvvv
qmvvvv
mm
σσσ
σ
σ
σ
σσ
σσ
αα
 
The numerator is positive and the two terms in the denominator are identical 
to the numerators in the respective market share functions, both positive. The 
total effect of introducing a termination margin is defined as the sum of the 
retail and the wholesale effect. We have calculated that the retail effect is 
larger than the total effect, thus the wholesale effect has to be negative. 
QED. 
 
The implication of proposition 5 is that the regulator can induce a given 
market share for the low cost firm at a lower deadweight loss due to 
distorted prices when the wholesale effect is neutralised. Thus it is welfare 
improving to introduce taxation in order to extract all net revenues due to the 
termination margin.  
 
The negative wholesale effect is driven by the fact that the volume of 
incoming traffic is given by: ( ) jii qˆ1 αα − . For a given termination margin, 
this volume is maximised for market shares equal to 0.5. We have already 
demonstrated that market shares for the low cost firm under cost based 
regulation are characterised by ( ) 5.00 >iα . Thus, there is an adverse effect 
for the low cost firm from increasing market shares. In a richer model where 
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we have three or more competing networks and where market shares are 
below 0.5 for the low cost firm we can expect the wholesale effect to be 
positive as well (in addition to the positive retail effect). Furthermore, 
networks typically receive a significant volume of incoming traffic from 
networks operating in other markets (e.g. incoming traffic from abroad 
and/or incoming traffic from fixed to a mobile network or vice versa). The 
share of this traffic being received by a network is monotonously increasing 
in market share. Thus it is likely that the wholesale effect is positive in a 
richer environment with more than two competing networks and where the 
competing networks also receive traffic from other markets. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied network competition when costs differ among 
the interconnected networks. We have analysed the implications of three 
different principles for regulating termination fees when marginal costs 
differ. The first case we have analysed is cost based in the sense that 
termination fees exactly reflect marginal costs. It is a standard result in the 
literature that marginal prices then are determined at the optimal level. In the 
current paper we have demonstrated that with cost differences equilibrium 
market shares are not optimal in this regime. The most efficient network is 
too small compared to a welfare maximising solution. The reason is partly 
that with cost differences there is a tariff mediated network externality. 
There is however no mechanism in the market that enables the efficient firm 
to internalise this effect. 
 
In the second regulatory regime we introduce taxation and subsidisation, of 
the two firms based on the number of subscribers as an addition to the cost 
based regulation of termination rates. By subsidising the low cost firm 
and/or imposing a tax on the high cost firm, the regulator can implement first 
best.  
 
In the third regime we investigate whether granting a termination mark-up to 
the low cost firm can improve the situation as compared to cost based 
regulation. We have demonstrated that the mark-up has the desired effect on 
market shares; the low cost firm becomes bigger. Furthermore, we have 
demonstrated that, starting from cost based regulation, welfare increases as a 
termination mark-up granted to the low cost firm is introduced. Thus it is 
welfare improving to let the efficient firm enjoy a (small) mark-up. The 
effect of granting a termination mark-up to the low cost firm can be 
decomposed into two parts, a retail effect and a wholesale effect. The retail 
effect is positive whereas the wholesale effect is negative. This is partly due 
to the fact that the volume of terminating traffic, where the firm enjoys a 
mark-up, is maximised for market shares equal to 0.5. Thus wholesale 
revenues decrease as market shares increase. 
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7. Appendix 
A.1. Conditions for interior solution to the welfare maximisation 
The solution: 
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is an optimum if second order conditions are fulfilled and [ ]1,0* ∈α . 
Consider first the second order conditions: 
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The function w(c) = u(q*(c)) - c q*(c) is decreasing and convex in c. Then  
v(ci) + v(cj) > 2 v((ci + wj)/2). Thus the right hand side is positive and 
increasing in the cost difference ci – cj. The second order condition is 
accordingly fulfilled as long as the two networks are sufficiently 
differentiated (σ small) and the cost difference is not too large. [ ]1,0* ∈α  if 
the following two conditions are fulfilled 
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Assume, without loss of generality that ci < cj, then ji vvv >> , the right 
hand side of the first condition above is then always negative. The first 
condition is accordingly always fulfilled. The right hand side of the second 
condition is always positive. If the cost difference is large, then this 
condition is violated. Finally, note that when this condition is fulfilled the 
second order condition above is also fulfilled. Thus a necessary and 
sufficient condition for an interior solution is: 
(A.1) vvi 222
1 −>σ  
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A.2. Conditions for existence and stability under cost based 
regulation 
Note first that the slope of the best response functions is ½, thus if 
equilibrium exists, it will be stable.  
 
Under cost based regulation equilibrium, market shares are: 
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a shared market equilibrium exists provided that ( )1,0∈CBiα . Without loss 
of generality we assume that firm i is the most efficient firm. Then we have 
the following parameter restriction: 
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Consider then the second order conditions for profit maximisation:  
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The sign of this expression is negative when the denominator is positive. 
This condition can be written: ( )vvv ji 22121 −+>σ  and is fulfilled when 
the condition above is fulfilled. 
 
The binding condition is accordingly:  
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This condition can be compared to the condition for an interior solution to 
the problem of welfare maximisation: ( )1,0∈CBiα  is fulfilled.  
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This condition is accordingly always satisfied when the condition 
vvi 222
1 −>σ  is satisfied. Thus if it is welfare maximising to have two 
networks then there will always exist an interior equilibrium under cost 
based regulation. Note that the opposite not is true. There exist parameter 
combinations such that the welfare maximising outcome is to have only one 
network but where we obtain shared equilibrium under cost based regulation.  
A.3. Deriving market shares when the most efficient firm is 
granted a margin 
In this case usage prices are: 
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The best response functions simplify to: 
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and: 
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Solving the system of equations above yields the following equilibrium fixed 
fees: 
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and: 
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The equilibrium fixed fees calculated above can be inserted into the market 
share function (1.). Then we obtain market shares as a function of the 
termination margin: 
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The only terms being functions of m are m, jj qv ˆ and ˆ , thus we can define 
constants K1 and K2: in order to simplify the expression: 
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Differentiation of the market share function with respect to the termination 
margin yields: 
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After rearranging we obtain: 
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A.4. Proof of proposition 4 
Total welfare as a function of the termination margin can be written: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )jjji qmvvvvfv
mW
ˆˆ11122
4
1 222
0 ++−+−+++−−−
=
αααααασ
 
We will call this function the second best welfare function. In (2.) we have 
defined first best welfare as a function of market shares as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )vvvfvW jiiiiii αααααασα −+−+++−−−= 12112241 2220*
 
With our parameter restrictions, this is a concave function with maximum 
for *αα = . We can substitute for the first best welfare function in the 
second best function such that:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )jjiii qmvvmmmWmW ˆˆ1* −−−−= ααα  
Let ( ) jj qmvvmg ˆˆ −−≡  denote the per subscriber deadweight loss. Note 
that: 
 0for0
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m
q
m
m
g j .  
Differentiation of the second best welfare yields: 
 27
 ( ) ( ) ( )
m
gmg
mm
W
m
W
iii
ii
i ∂
∂−−−∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂ αααααα 121
*
 
Consider first the derivative at the point where m = 0, where g = 0 and g’ = 
0. Then the two last terms become zero and we have:  
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Thus, in the point where the termination margin is zero, the second best 
welfare function is an increasing function of the termination margin.  
 
Letting the termination margin increase above zero has several effects. In 
particular the per subscriber deadweight loss, g(m) increases, whereas the 
number of subscribers being exposed to the increased price ( )( )ii αα −1  
decreases due to the fact that the market share of the low cost firm is an 
increasing function of the termination margin. Thus there is opposing effects 
on total welfare from increasing the termination margin. Consider the 
interval where m > 0¸ and smaller than ( ){ }*~ αα == mmm . Then we have 
the following signs on the various terms in the welfare function: 
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i.e. the sum of one positive and one negative term. We do however know 
that close to m = 0, the positive terms dominate. Numerical simulations 
indicate that for reasonable parameter values, the negative dead weight loss 
effect dominates for sufficiently high termination margins. 
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Abstract
We consider a two-stage game between two competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
The firms offer access to the Internet. Access is assumed to be vertically and horizontally
differentiated. Our model exhibits network externalities. In the first stage the two ISPs
choose the level of compatibility (i.e. quality of a direct interconnect link between the two
´networks). In the second stage the two ISPs compete a-la Hotelling. We find that the ISPs
can reduce the stage 2 competitive pressure by increasing compatibility due to the network
externality. The firms will thus agree upon a high compatibility at stage 1. When it is costly
to invest in compatibility, we find that the firms overinvest, as compared to the welfare
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1. Introduction
We consider competition between two ISPs (Internet Service Providers)
operating in the same geographical area. The product from these service providers
is basically access to the Internet, and the ISPs operate their own local network.
Internet access is assumed to be horizontally and vertically differentiated from the
customer’s point of view. Furthermore we assume that there are positive
consumption externalities.
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Competition is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage the ISPs
determine the quality of interconnection. This choice of interconnection quality
can be considered as a choice of compatibility between the networks. In the second
`stage, for given compatibility, the two firms compete a la Hotelling in attracting
customers.
The motivation for the paper is the observation that ISPs competing in the same
geographic area typically offer higher quality for on-net communication as
compared to off-net communication. Roughly, on-net communication refers to
traffic between computers /customers connected to the same ISP, while off-net
communication is between computers /customers connected to different networks,
e.g. communication between customers subscribing to competing ISPs. Some
analysts are arguing that competing ISPs have become more willing to establish
private interconnection arrangements. It is however hard to verify this observation
because ISPs typically have a non-disclosure policy with respect to the
1
agreements .
The majority of the literature on Internet economics focuses on the US-market.
In contrast, our paper is motivated by the situation for competing ISPs outside
USA. Previously, the attention in the ISP-markets outside USA has been directed
2to the quality of the connection to the US . The quality of local communication
between competing ISPs was rather unimportant since the majority of the Internet
content was in the US. The situation is, however, altered, and the portion of the
Internet-traffic where both the sender and the receiver are located in the same area
is increasing. This tendency is probably due to new customer-types and new
services in the Internet. In non-English speaking countries content intended for the
mass-market must be produced locally or translated. Furthermore, for new
broadband interactive services, such as telemedicine, tele-education, and video
conferencing, a relatively larger portion of the communication is probably between
customers in the same geographical area as compared to what is the case for
conventional Internet services such as web-browsing. Thus, the importance of
local interconnection as a strategic variable has increased.
Utility from network participation depends on the number of potential com-
munication partners and the quality of this communication. For given market
shares, the customer’s willingness to pay is increasing in interconnection quality. It
is not obvious, however, that competing firms will choose a high quality. In the
presence of network externalities, customers will ceteris paribus consider it more
advantageous to choose the larger ISP if the chosen quality of interconnection is
1 The quality in the network is determined by the ratio between capacity and load. The load is
varying on a very short time scale. Thus it is hard to observe the quality differential between off and on
net traffic from the outside. A customer of a particular ISP will however gain experience over time with
particular routes and thus be in a position to assess the quality differential.
2 Baake and Wichmann (1998) are focusing on the German market, Ergas (2000) and Little et al.
(2000) analyze the Australian market, while Mueller et al. (1997) describe the situation in Hong Kong.
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reduced. A large ISP may accordingly choose a low interconnection quality in
order to increase its market share.
Following several recent studies of the competition in the telecommunication
market, e.g. Laffont et al. (1998a,b), we assume that firms offer horizontally
differentiated goods. The motivation for this horizontal differentiation is receiving
little attention in the literature. In our setting, product differentiation in the
horizontal dimension may be given several interpretations. Customers of ISPs are
typically buying some complementary products to the Internet access. Private
customers connect to the ISP via the telephone line, the television cable or the
mobile phone system. Most ISPs are owned by, or, are in co-operation with a
supplier of local access, such as cable-TV or local telephony operators. This is one
source of horizontal differentiation, since e.g., cable-TV-access suppliers can offer
the best incoming capacity, while local telephony companies have more ex-
perience with switching technologies and two-way communications. A customer
mainly looking for interactive-TV and secondly internet connectivity, will proba-
bly prefer the service from an ISP that is a subsidiary of a cable-TV provider. In
contrast, for home–office internet connectivity the customer may prefer a
subsidiary of a telephone provider. Customers with preferences for mobility
choose mobile wireless access although the capacity is lower than for, e.g.
cable-TV access.
Another source of horizontal differentiation is the alliances between ISPs and
content providers. The ISPs may choose to specialize in offering high quality of
some services and thus attracting customers preferring these services. In the
AOL–Time Warner merger a hot topic has been whether vertical integration of a
content company (Time Warner) and an ISP (AOL) may create incentives to
foreclose rivals from accessing some services (‘‘a walled garden strategy’’).
1.1. Related literature
There are to our knowledge few papers explicitly considering ISP competition
´and compatibility choice, but Cremer et al. (2000) and Mason (1999) are notable
3
examples .
´We are here following Cremer et al. (2000) by modelling network externalities
such that customers benefit from an increase in network size, and furthermore, the
positive network effect is a function of the degree of compatibility. In contrast to
´the model in the present paper, Cremer et al. (2000) is assuming that the firms
have installed bases and are engaged in Cournot-type competition where the
providers compete in attracting new consumers. They find that the firms may have
incentives to degrade interconnection quality under market sharing equilibrium.
3 Other papers looking into ISP competition are DangNguyen and Penard (1999) and Baake and
Wichmann (1998). Furthermore, there are some papers looking into congestion control for ISPs under
competition, see e.g. Gibbons et al. (2000) and Mason (2000).
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This result is in contrast to the results in the present paper and is driven by
asymmetries in the installed bases. Thus, in a market with consumer lock-in as in
the Cremer et al. model, a large firm may choose a low interconnection quality,
whereas in a market with mobile consumers, as in the present paper, a large firm
will choose a high interconnection quality.
Mason (1999) models ISP-competition with both horizontal and vertical
differentiation, and furthermore, with a timing structure similar to our’s. In line
with our results, Mason finds that compatibility results in reduced competitive
pressure. However, in his paper the firms choose between perfect compatibility
and incompatibility at stage 1, and hence, he does not see the positive externality
4
as continuous function of compatibility . Consequently it is not straightforward to
consider questions of over-investment in compatibility in the Mason model.
The strategic effect of interconnection quality does also have many similarities
with the strategic effect of interconnect price (for given quality) in telephony
networks. In telephony networks, the positive externality effect of having many
subscribers on competing networks is reduced when the price of making calls
across networks increase. In the limiting case with extremely high price of making
off-net calls, the telephony subscriber will be indifferent as to the size of the
competing network. A high interconnection price will accordingly have similar
5
strategic effects as a low interconnection quality . Both in the telephony
interconnection models as well as the present paper, network externalities drives
6the strategic effect of interconnect quality .
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief overview of
the network structure. In Section 3 we present our model. Finally, in Section 4 we
conclude.
2. A brief overview of the network structure
In Fig. 1 we give an illustration of the competition between the ISPs and the
choice of compatibility (or interconnection quality). We assume that two ISPs
compete in a given market, and we suppose that for communication between own
¯customers (on-net traffic) the ISPs is offering a quality guarantee of k. If there is
4 The Mason (1999) model exhibits both vertical and horizontal heterogeneity in consumer
preferences. The relative weight of vertical and horizontal aspects is parameterised. In the extreme case
with only horizontal consumer heterogeneity, Mason obtains similar result as in the present paper with
respect to compatibility.
5 See Laffont et al. (1998a,b), and Armstrong (1998). Furthermore, in Laffont and Tirole (2000) it is
provided an extensive overview of interconnection strategy related to telecommunication.
6 Such externalities were first given a theoretical treatment by Rohlfs (1974). The strategic effect of
network externalities on competition was recognized by Katz and Shapiro (1985). As pointed out by
Katz and Shapiro, externalities and the choice of compatibility are closely related.
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Fig. 1. The interconnection structure.
no private interconnection agreement between the ISPs, no such quality guarantee
is given for off-net traffic. Off-net communication between ISP A and ISP B will
be sent through a public interconnection point, and the quality level is equal to
off-net communication with other destinations in the global Internet Backbone (see
Fig. 1). Let the quality of off-net traffic through the public interconnection point
¯be k (where k , k ). We assume that this public interconnection point is adminis-
] ] 7trated and controlled by a non-commercial third party . The quality level at the
public interconnection point is assumed to be outside the control of both ISP A and
8ISP B .
ISP A and ISP B do, however, have the opportunity to invest in a direct link
between their networks, i.e. they can invest in a direct interconnect point. If they
do, the quality level related to communication between ISP A and ISP B is k,
¯where k # k # k (see Fig. 1). The aim of this paper is to analyze the incentives
]
competing ISPs have to implement such direct interconnection. The issue will
probably be more important when local access networks are upgraded to high-
speed internet communication (broadband) and new bandwidth-demanding ser-
vices that tolerate minor delays (real time services as interactive video) are offered.
7 Bailey and McKnight (1997) described four interconnection models where exchange point
described here refers to what they called Third-Party Administrator. The other categories are Peer-to-
Peer Bilateral, Hierarchical Bilateral, and Co-operative Agreement.
8 The frequently observed bottleneck problems in public interconnection points in both Europe and
the US (see e.g. Kende, 2000) are indications that single ISPs not are able to increase the quality of its
services over the public interconnection points. This is probably due to both coordination and free rider
problems.
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The quality offered in the open internet (the quality level k) cannot deliver these
]9
services .
In this paper we will not consider the interplay between the regional ISPs we
have in mind and the backbone providers controlling the core global infrastructure
10(the Internet backbone) . Furthermore, we do not focus on the interplay between
ISPs selling internet connectivity and the providers of local access (the last mile
into homes). However, as mentioned above, the ISPs and the local access
providers are often vertically integrated.
The non-disclosure practice related to private interconnection agreements makes
it impossible to know exactly the number of such contracts between competing
11ISPs . In the US private interconnection agreements are common between the
core Internet backbone providers. Also the regional ISPs in Europe have private
interconnection agreements with backbone providers at a higher level and in other
countries. However, until now, the competing ISPs seem to have been reluctant to
implement direct interconnection links in Europe. The non-disclosure characteris-
tic makes it difficult to say whether this trend is changing, but several analysts
12
argue that private interconnection seem to be more common also outside the US .
3. The model
The preferences of customers are assumed to be distributed uniformly with
density 1 on a line of length 1. The two firms (a and b) are located at the extremes
of this unit line, firm a is at x 5 0 and firm b is at x 5 1. The unit cost for eacha b
firm is c, and the customers have unit demands. The location of preferences on the
unit line indicates the most preferred network type for each customer.
Net utility for a customer located at x connected to supplier i is accordingly:
U 5 v 2 tux 2 x u 1 b ? (n 1 kn ) 2 p where i, j 5 a, b i ± ji i i i j i
The first term is a fixed advantage v of being connected to network. We definei
u ; v 2 v . As long u 5 0 there is no vertical differentiation, while the servicesi i j i
are vertically differentiated when u ± 0. The second term is the disutility from noti
9 Interactive services may be among the most profitable services in the Internet. One reason for the
profitability of interactive services is that they are less prone to personal arbitrage and reselling than
services tolerating some delays (Choi et al., 1997). Another reason is that customers have higher
willingness to pay for new information. This will be especially true for strategic information such as
stock exchange rates (Shapiro and Varian, 1998).
10
´See Cremer et al. (2000) on the interplay between Internet Backbone Providers.
11 See Kende (2000) and Gareiss (1999). Kende (2000) gives a comprehensive description of the
interconnection agreements between the core backbone providers, and he indicates that as much as 80%
of the internet traffic in the US goes through private interconnection points.
12 See Chinoy and Solo (1997) and Cawley (1997). In Gareiss (1999) there is an overview of private
interconnections agreements.
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consuming the most preferred network type (the transportation cost in the standard
Hotelling model). The third term is a utility term depending upon the number of
on-net and off-net customers (n and n respectively) equal to b ? (n 1 kn ), wherei j i j
b $ 0 and ke[k,1]. b is measuring the network externality. For b 5 0 consumers
]
are indifferent with the respect to the size of the two networks. The parameter k
can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of the interconnect arrangement.
When the quality of interconnect equals unity, customers are indifferent as to the
distribution of off-net and on-net customers since on- and off-net traffic have
identical quality. This is opposed to a situation where k , 1. Then, all other things
being equal, a customer will prefer a network with many customers. When k 5k
]
the quality equals the quality available via the Internet (the public interconnection
point in Fig. 1), whereas k .k implies that the two ISPs have agreed upon
]
establishing an interconnect arrangement (the private interconnection point in Fig.
1) with superior quality. The fourth term, p is the per period price charged for ISPi
13
subscription . The customers’ utility functions are accordingly linear in consump-
tion of the network service and money.
We make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1. We assume that each of the customers along the interval [0,1]
value the products sufficiently high such that they always prefer to subscribe to
one or the other network. Thus, the fixed advantage v of being connected to eitheri
network is sufficiently large.
Assumption 2. There exist one customer in market equilibrium located at x, where
0 , x , 1, who is indifferent between consuming the network service from the two
firms. Thus the valuation differential u between products of the two firms isi
sufficiently low such that: u u # 3(t 2 b(1 2 k)).i
We will later demonstrate that Assumption 2 indeed is necessary to obtain a
shared market equilibrium. Notice in particular that Assumption 2 implies that
t . b(1 2 k). If this property is violated equilibrium can be characterized by
cornering even in ‘‘symmetric’’ cases with u 5 0 and p 5 p because the networki i j
14
externality is dominating the transportation cost .
We define a as the market share of firm i. Assumptions 1 and 2 are theni
13 Thus, we do not consider any form for usage-based pricing. At first glance, this assumption is
more realistic for internet connectivity in the US where flat-rate pricing is the norm for local access.
However, we are also observing flat-rate pricing in Europe, in particular for broadband internet
connectivity. For a discussion of the usage-based regime in Europe related to Internet access, see e.g.
Cave and Crowther (1999).
14 Assume that almost all customers along the unit line, for some reason, are connected to supplier a.
The marginal customer with the longest distance to travel to supplier a, will compare the offer from the
two suppliers and he will choose supplier a (and the market will accordingly be characterised by
cornering) if: b(1 1k0) 2 t . b(0 1k). Thus t . b(1 2k) is ruling out the possibility of market
] ] ]
cornering in such symmetric cases.
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implying that n 5 a , n 5 1 2 a . For a given price vector, the location ofi i j i
preferences x [ (0,1) for the consumer satisfying U 5 U is determining thea b
market shares. By defining s ; 1/(2(t 2 b(1 2 k))) we can write the market shares
of firm i:
1
]a 5 1 su 2 s( p 2 p )i i i j2
s is a function of k where s(k) . 0, s(1) 5 1/2t, s9(k) , 0. Notice that
Assumption 2 assures that s . 0. The market share functions are very similar to
the market share functions in a standard Hotelling model and if k 5 1 and/or
b 5 0, the expression for market shares are identical to what we obtain in a
standard Hotelling model with unit demand (i.e. a model without network
externalities). In the standard Hotelling model, the parameter s is interpreted as a
measure of product substitutability. The products become closer substitutes if the
transportation cost, t, between the two products is reduced. From our definition of
s it also follows that the products become closer substitutes, in the eyes of the
consumers, if the quality of the link between the two networks is reduced. We can
accordingly expect that an increase in the cost of transport and an increase in the
quality of the link between the two networks to have similar effects upon prices
and profits.
3.1. The two-stage game
We are considering a two-stage game. In the first stage the two ISPs set the
interconnection quality k such that k # k # 1. In the second stage, the two ISP
]
simultaneously set their prices for a given k.
3.1.1. Stage 2
In stage 2 the firms set their prices simultaneously, and firm i is choosing p soi
as to maximize profits given by:
1
]S Dp 5 ( p 2 c)a 5 ( p 2 c) 1 su 2 s( p 2 p )i i i i i i j2
Combining the first order conditions for firm i and j yields:
u su1 1i i
] ] ] ]p 5 1 1 c and a 5 1i i2s 3 2 3
We will have a shared market equilibrium if and only if a [ (0,1) which isi
satisfied under Assumption 2.
Inserting equilibrium prices and market shares as well as the definition of s in
the profit function and rearranging yields:
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2u u(t 2 b(1 2 k)) i i
]]]] ] ]]]]]p (u,k) 5 1 1 (1)i 2 3 18(t 2 b(1 2 k))
When k51 and/or b 5 0, this profit function is identical to the one we obtain in
a conventional Hotelling model with unit demand.
3.1.2. Stage 1
At stage 1 of the game the two firms decide whether to set up an interconnect
arrangement or not. As already stated, stage 2 profit is a function of the quality of
interconnection. Direct differentiation of the profit function (1) with respect to k
yields:
2
≠p (u,k) u1i i
]]] ] ]]]]]5 b 1 2 (2)S D2≠k 2 9(t 2 b(1 2 k))
By definition we have u 5 2u , and thus we get:j i
≠p≠p ji
] ]5 ;k
≠k ≠k
We readily see that the firms do not have conflicting interests with respect to
network compatibility, implying that the two firms always agree upon the optimal
interconnection quality-level k. Consequently, there is no need for an assumption
ensuring that the firm with the lowest incentives for quality has a veto in setting k.
The condition for having a shared market equilibrium is u u # 3(t 2 b(1 2 k))i
(Assumption 2). This condition implies that the large bracket above is positive.
Thus in any shared market equilibrium profits of both firms increase in inter-
connect quality.
The effect upon profits from changing interconnect quality can be decomposed
into a price and a market share (or volume) effect by differentiating: p 5 a ( p 2i i i
c):
≠p≠p ≠a i
] ] ]5 ( p 2 c) 1 ai i≠k ≠k ≠k
The first term is the market share effect and the second term is the price effect.
By inserting the definition of s in the equilibrium price and differentiating with
respect to k we obtain: ≠p /≠k 5 b. The price effect is accordingly positive fori
both firms. This is opposed to the market share effect. When u ± 0, market sharesi
are functions of interconnect quality. By substituting for s in the equilibrium
market shares and differentiating we obtain:
≠a 2u bi i
] ]]]]]5 (3)2≠k 6(t 2 b(1 2 k))
The market share effect is positive for the firm selling the inferior service and
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thus it is negative for the firm selling the superior service. The negative market
share effect for the firm selling the superior product is however dominated by the
positive price effect as demonstrated above.
3.1.2.1. Cost free interconnection quality
Assume it is costless to improve the quality of interconnect. As demonstrated
above, the differentiated profit function is everywhere increasing in k for both
firms. Thus the firms have no incentives to damage the quality of the link between
the two networks and furthermore, if possible, they have a mutual interest in
improving the quality of this link. Then, both on-net and off-net traffic have the
¯same quality level k 5 k 5 1.
Prices and profits increasing in the quality of the link between the two networks
are due to two effects. First, for given market shares willingness to pay is
increasing from all customers as the quality is increased. Second, when the quality
of the link is increased the competition between the two suppliers becomes less
15
aggressive . When comparing the conventional Hotelling model with our model
featuring network externalities, the argument can be put the other way around:
When the networks offer less than perfect connectivity (k , 1) then the firms will
compete more aggressively than what the conventional Hotelling model predicts.
3.1.2.2. Convex costs of interconnection quality
The assumption above that firms can increase interconnection quality without
incurring costs is clearly an unrealistic assumption since both router and
transmission capacity is costly in the market place. Furthermore there will be
transaction cost of writing a contract and there will typically be costs of mutual
monitoring. We can thus add realism to our model by taking into account that
interconnection is costly. Then the shape of the interconnection cost function will
affect the optimal solution. A necessary condition for an interior solution (k [
(k,1)) is that the interconnect cost function is convex.
]
One can argue that it is reasonable to expect the interconnection cost to be
convex, since, as interconnect quality increase, the complexity of the contract the
two firms can write becomes large. As the quality of interconnect increase, the
joint network of the two suppliers become more like a common facility where the
firms have ample opportunities of opportunistic behavior. Firms will typically be
reluctant to agree upon interconnection unless the contract prohibits opportunistic
behavior. In order to observe and verify that the contract indeed is fulfilled, costly
mutual monitoring is required.
In the following we will assume the cost of investing in interconnect quality in
15 1
]The best response functions (‘‘reaction functions’’) in stage 2 of the game is: p 5 R( p ) 5 (t 2i j 2
b(1 2 k) 1 p 1u 1 c). An increase in k will result in parallel shifts outwards for these best responsej i
functions and the firms does indeed become less aggressive as the quality of interconnect increase. We
can furthermore see R9 5 0.5, we are thus considering a stable Nash equilibrium.
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order to increase the quality of interconnect k above k is I 5 I(k), where I(k) 5 0,] ]
I9 . 0, I0 . 0 lim I(k) 5 ` and lim I9(k) 5 0. Assume now that the two1k fi 1 k fi k ]]firms are forming an input joint venture where they equally share the cost of
investing in interconnect quality. Each firm will then maximize the stage 2 profit
minus the share of the interconnect cost the firm has to pay in stage 1. Thus the
two firms will solve identical optimization problems and agree upon a interconnect
dquality level k characterized by:
d i 1
]k 5 arg max(p (u,k) 2 I(k)).2
Thus the investment joint venture investment level is characterized by:
2bu i
]]]]]I9(k) 5 b 2 29(t 2 b(1 2 k))
For u ± 0 the profit functions are convex in k. With our assumptions we havei
p9(k) . I9(k) and p9(1) , I9(1). Thus there exist at least one k [ (k,1) satisfying
] ] ]
the first order conditions. For u 5 0 there is one and only one k satisfying the firsti
order condition. The second order conditions are satisfied and this solution is
indeed optimal. For u ± 0 we cannot rule out the possibility that there is more than
one k satisfying the first order condition. A sufficient condition for a single unique
solution is that the marginal profit curve and the marginal investment curve cross
only once. We will in the following assume that the marginal curves cross only
once.
We can compare this equilibrium quality level with the socially optimal quality.
The first best interconnect quality, k*, is defined as the quality level that is
maximizing customer gross surplus minus total production cost. Consider, for
simplicity, the model in the absence of vertical differentiation (i.e. u 5 0). Firsti
best is then evidently characterized by sharing customers evenly among the two
firms since the unit cost of serving customers in the two firms are identical and
customers are distributed uniformly on the interval, Then average distance from
the most preferred brand is 0.25. Inserting this average distance as well as the
optimal market shares in the utility function yields the following welfare function:
k* 5 arg max[v 2 0.25t 1 0.5b ? (1 1 k) 2 c 2 I(k)].i
The first best investment level is then characterized by:
0.5b 5 I9(k)
This is in contrast to the investment level in the input joint venture. In the absence
of vertical differentiation the optimal investment level for the input joint venture
is: b 5 I9(k). An input joint venture will thus choose a quality level of the
interconnect arrangement exceeding the socially optimal level. In the Appendix we
demonstrate that we obtain a similar over investment result in the model under
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vertical differentiation as well. The intuition behind the over investment result is
the following: There are two effects leading to the firms’ stage 2 profits increasing
in interconnect quality: The first effect is that for given market shares willingness
to pay is increasing from all customers as the quality is increased. The second
effect is that when the quality of the link is increased, the competition between the
two suppliers becomes less aggressive. Only the first effect is a social gain. Thus
the input joint venture is over-investing in interconnect quality in order to reduce
the stage 2 competitive pressure.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the incentives for an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) to strategically degrade the interconnection quality with the competitors. We
have modeled this in a game where two firms choose the quality of interconnection
´before they compete over market shares a la Hotelling. In the case where there is
no vertical differentiation, the firms split the market equally, and they have no
incentives to degrade interconnection quality. Moreover, when interconnection is
costly the firms will over-invest in interconnection quality as compared to the first
best quality level.
We have also demonstrated that if the products from the two firms also are
vertically differentiated, then the firm providing the superior product will have the
larger market share. When the necessary conditions for a shared market equilib-
rium is fulfilled, the firms will agree upon the optimal interconnection quality.
Furthermore, if interconnection quality is costly, the firms will agree upon a
quality of interconnect exceeding the welfare maximizing quality level.
Finally it is not straightforward to compare the model results with the
interconnection policy in the market place due to the non-disclosure policy.
Representatives in the industry do however make statements indicating that
competing ISPs do interconnect in cases where the two firms in question are
sufficiently symmetric. Such observations are lending support to the results of the
present paper.
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Appendix A. Welfare maximizing interconnect investments
Consumers with preferences to the left of some point a join network a. Since
the individual transport cost is tx, and the distribution of consumers is uniform
along the line, the sum of travelling costs for all consumers joining the networks
2 2
are 1 /2a t and 1/2(1 2 a) t for network a and b respectively. In stage 2 of the
game the social welfare function is:
1
]W(k) 5max[ahv 2 at 1 b(a 1 k(1 2 a)) 2 cja 2a
1
]1 (1 2 a)hv 2 (1 2 a)t 1 b(1 2 a 1 ka) 2 cj]b 2
The welfare maximizing market share a* is thus:
u1 a
] ]]]]]a* 5 12 2(t 2 2b(1 2 k))
It can be shown that the market share of the firm selling the superior product will
be to small in market equilibrium as compared to the welfare maximising market
share. In special cases, the welfare maximising solution is to let the firm selling the
superior product serve the entire market whereas both firms are active in the
market equilibrium Notice that this results not is specific to our model featuring
network externalities. With the parameter value b 5 0, the model does not exhibit
network externalities (and thus there is no effect upon utility by improving
interconnect quality). Then the welfare maximising market share is: a* 5 1/2 1
u /2t whereas market equilibrium is characterised by: a* 5 1/2 1u /6t. Thus thea a
market share of the firm selling the superior product is to small.
The stage 1 socially optimal investment level is:
k* 5 arg max(W(k) 2 I(k))
FoC: W9 5 I9
By applying the envelope theorem on W(k):
2bu≠W b a
] ] ]]]]]* *5 2ba*(1 2 a*) 5 2ba a 5 2a b 2≠k 2 2(t 2 2b(1 2 k))
In cases where the welfare maximizing network is characterized by market
sharing, the following condition is fulfilled: t 2 2b(1 2 k) . u u. Both thea
numerator and denominator are then positive and in such cases welfare is
everywhere increasing in interconnect quality. The welfare maximizing inter-
connect quality is found by solving: k* 5 arg max(W(k) 2 I(k)). The first order
condition is accordingly:
2bu≠W b a
] ] ]]]]]2 I9(k) 5 0Û 2 5 I9(k)2≠k 2 2(t 2 2b(1 2 k))
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The input joint venture will accordingly over-invest in interconnect quality when:
2 2bu bubi a
]]]]] ] ]]]]]b 2 . 2 Û2 229(t 2 b(1 2 k)) 2(t 2 2b(1 2 k))
b 1 12] ]]]]] ]]]]]1 bu 2 . 0iS 2 2D2 2(t 2 2b(1 2 k)) 9(t 2 b(1 2 k))
A sufficient condition is then that the large bracket is positive. This is the case
since:
2 22(t 2 2b(1 2 k)) , 9(t 2 b(1 2 k))
2 2 20 , 7t 2 10bt(1 2 k) 1 b (1 2 k)
2 2 2 2 2
5 7t 2 10bt(1 2 k) 2 8b (1 2 k) 1 9b (1 2 k)
2 20 , (t 2 2b(1 2 k))(7t 1 4b(1 2 k)) 19b (1 2 k)
#%%%"!%%%$ #%%"!%%$
1 1
It is only socially optimal to set up a direct link between the two networks if both
networks have a positive market share, this is the case when (t 2 2b(1 2 k)) . u u.a
Thus the first bracket has to be positive. An input joint venture will accordingly
over invest in interconnect quality under product differentiation as well as in the
absence of vertical differentiation.
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